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INTRODUCTION
The concept of using legal structures to protect property from those
who might otherwise have some claim to it is an idea with deep roots.
This concept, for example, accounts for the rise of the "use" in early
English history. That device arose in feudal England to circumvent
claims of the King, overlords, and the eldest son's claim to inherit land.'
The use ultimately evolved to become the modem day trust.2 Following
that evolution, American courts in the late nineteenth century gave
validity to the protective variation known as the spendthrift trust.3 As
the spendthrift trust enjoyed surprisingly rapid acceptance during that
period, the trust's most recognized critic, John Chipman Gray, observed
that "the change in the law ... as to spendthrift trusts ... has been in
several jurisdictions during the last dozen years so rapid and complete
as to form an interesting episode in legal history."4
I See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium,
or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 557 n.57 (1998)
(discussing the English use as a tool to avoid creditors and otherwise applicable legal rules); John
H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 632-33 (1995)
(discussing early uses of the trust form to avoid feudal and other legal restrictions); Henry
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Function of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 451-54 (1998) (discussing how a primary role of trust law is to
rearrange the relationship between creditors and the parties to a trust). See generally Stewart E.
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035,
1040-41 (2000) ("[T]he Anglo-American trust has endured because it has proven to be a powerful
tool for accomplishing a wide range of objectives.... [I]t should not be surprising that, since
their conception, settlors have often used trusts to avoid otherwise applicable legal rules.").
2 See, e.g., Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities, 10
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 99-103 (2000) (discussing the history of the trust legal form as derived
from the English use); Howard D. Rosen & Gideon Rothschild, Asset Protection Planning, Part
VI.A (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 810-2d 2005) (discussing the use, the English Statute of
Uses, and evolution of the modem trust by the seventeenth century).
3 "Spendthrift trusts" are defined and discussed in more detail at infra note 21 and the
accompanying text. For two of the more important early cases recognizing the validity of
spendthrift trusts, see Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), and Broadway National Bank v.
Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882). As to the uniquely American status of spendthrift trusts, see
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 572 (1964) (describing "a
peculiarity of American trust law, the spendthrift trust doctrine"); George P. Costigan, Jr., Those
Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471,
474 (1934) ("[T]he doctrine [of spendthrift trust law] is modem American .. "). To this day,
spendthrift trusts are not recognized in England, where the use originated. IIA AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 150 (4th ed. 1987).
4 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at xii (2d ed.
1895). With regard to the early acceptance of spendthrift trusts, see, for example, Friedman,
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There have been a number of recent developments that could easily
place Gray's observation as characterizing the turn of the twenty-first
century. Indeed, consideration of those developments recently
prompted one leading modem-day trust scholar to comment that "[w]e
may come to look back to these times and recognize that we are looking
at a period of time when there was great change in the nature of the
trust, especially as to spendthrift rules.' 5 Among the developments
provoking such commentary are the efforts of a number of offshore
jurisdictions to attract trust business by enhancing asset protection for
locally-based trusts, which efforts generally began in the mid-to-late
1980s.6 Those efforts ultimately became a domestic phenomenon as
Alaska in 1997, followed by four other jurisdictions since, adopted
comprehensive legislation validating protection from creditors through
the self-settled trust device. 7 Prior to this, the rejection of such self-
created settlor protections was so common as to be assumed, though
cogent arguments undermining the bases for this prohibition have
appeared from time to time.8
supra note 3, at 582 ("The decisive cases validating the [spendthrift] clause fall into a relatively
narrow time-span, beginning about 1880, following in rapid succession for about 25 years, then
tapering off, since most jurisdictions had by then settled the major issue."); see also Karen E.
Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1195, 1197
(2000) ("As spendthrift trusts gained recognition at the turn of the nineteenth century, their
primary foe, John Chipman Gray, acknowledged defeat without surrendering his objections.")
(footnotes omitted).
5 Dobris, supra note 1, at 562 n.83. Professor Dobris also notes that "[wle are in a moment
in time when our ideas about what a trust is, what it is for, and how to operate it are under
consideration and, indeed, are changing meaningfully." Id. at 543.
6 See Sterk, supra note 1, at 1035-40 (discussing offshore trust movement); Dobris, supra
note 1, at 551-53 n.44 (discussing origins of offshore movement and relating that movement to
domestic trends).
7 The additional four states are Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island, and most recently, Utah.
For a detailed overview of the domestic legislation in each state, see ASSET PROTECTION
STRATEGIES 489-97 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr., ed., A.B.A. 2002); and Rosen & Rothschild, supra
note 2, Part VII.A.
8 See, e.g., ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 282.1 (2d ed. 1947) ("It is almost
universally held that a person cannot create an effective spendthrift trust for his own
benefit .. "); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959) (denying protections to self-
settled spendthrift, discretionary, and support trusts); Sterk, supra note 1, at 1043 (discussing the
foundation for the historical prohibition against self-settled trusts).
For varying analyses of such trusts, see, for example, Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the
Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2001); Boxx, supra note 4, at 1251-
61; Henry J. Lischer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 479, 523-47 (2000) (providing detailed list of factors weighing for and against
recognition of self-settled asset protection trusts); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public
Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); Costigan, Jr., supra
note 3; GRISWOLD, supra, § 557. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, ch. 12, introductory note
(2001).
The "settlor" of a trust can be generally identified as the person who provides any portion
of the property or other consideration that funds a trust. The settlor may or may not also be the
person who executes the trust instrument, and there may be multiple settlors of a single trust. For
purposes of this Article, "settlor" generally refers to a single individual who both executes a trust
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The recent and noticeable break with the traditional denial of self-
settled trust protections is not the only significant recent development,
however. The self-settled asset protection trust movement is
accompanied by the recent completion of two major law reform
projects. The drafting and recommendation for state adoption of a
Uniform Trust Code is one such project.9 The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts is the second. 10  Taken together, these developments have
recently affected and will undoubtedly continue to influence the
evolution of trust asset protection in the coming years.
This Article considers these developments and their potential
impact on the future course of trust asset protection. The approach here
is not, however, one of debating the analytical or moral propriety of
asset protection trusts, as others have provided meaningful insight on
that topic." Nor is the effort here to catalogue all of the rules adopted
by the drafters of the two reform projects noted above. Again, others
have facilitated our understanding of such matters. 12  This Article
instead seeks to complement those prior works by considering what
these trends in operation suggest for the future course of trust asset
protection.
instrument and provides the property that funds the trust. For a further discussion of "settlor"
status, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmts. e-f& reporter's note.
9 The text of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) was finalized in late 2000, and its comments
completed in April, 2001. The UTC was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, which "provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-
drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law."
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, ABA Approves Six NCCUSL
Acts, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?
ItemlD=92. A thorough background on the UTC project can be found in Michelle W. Clayton,
Enacting the Uniform Trust Code, available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/
estate/2003/3/clayton.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). For more on the nature and purpose of the
UTC, see infra Part Ill.
10 The Restatement (Third) project was undertaken by the American Law Institute in the late
1980s. Portions of the Restatement (Third) relating to fiduciary investments were completed in
1990. A tentative draft of those portions of the Restatement (Third) relating to spendthrift trusts
and creditors rights was approved in 1999 and received final approval in 2001. For more on the
nature and purpose of the Restatement, see infra Part 111.
I I See sources cited supra note 8; see also Boxx, supra note 4, at 1251-61; Randall J. Gingiss,
Putting a Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987 (1999); Lynn Lopucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).
12 See, e.g., Valerie J. Vollmar, Simply Explained: UTC Article 5 on Creditors' Rights, UTC
NOTES (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws), Winter 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.utcproject.org/utc/uploads/UTCnotes DecO4_print.pdf; Alan Newman, The Rights of
Creditors and Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise,
69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 773 (2001); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and
Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877 (2000). There are many
other issues relating to these projects that continue to be worthy of further discussion but which
are at best only touched upon here. Such issues include the projects' impact on rights to
Medicaid benefits, the consequences where beneficiaries serve as trustees, rights to "overdue
distributions," and the trustee's need to consider a beneficiary's non-trust resources in making
distribution decisions.
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There are, of course, no certainties in this regard--only ideas. Part
II, however, deals with known quantities by providing a brief
explanation of the nature of traditional trust protections. Those
protections include the spendthrift trust, discretionary trust interests, and
self-settled arrangements, all of which are to some extent touched upon
in this Article. Part III ventures into the realm of ideas through a
discussion of the noted reform projects, with an emphasis on the UTC
for reasons that should become apparent. Beginning with matters
affecting the protections traditionally afforded discretionary trust
interests and the criticisms directed at the reform projects' approaches
to those protections, the discussion in Part III proceeds to consider those
special or "exception" creditors who might prevail over the protections
typically afforded both discretionary and spendthrift trusts. Among the
observations presented is the idea that the UTC holds a significant place
in the development of trust asset protection-not so much because of
the conclusions its drafters reached as to particular rules, but more
because of the express invitation the UTC presents to state legislatures
to ponder their own trust protections and corresponding placement in
the modem asset protection community.
Part IV next provides insights into both the current and evolving
status of trust asset protection by relating the noted reform projects to
several trust protection developments seen in the last decade or so. This
leads to an exploration in Parts V and VI that gives more attention to
self-settled trust protections. That exploration proceeds from a
recognition of interest group politics as related to the UTC movement in
Part V, to an evaluation of potential ideological influences on the future
course of trust asset protections in Part VI. Along the way,
consideration is given to the federal influences on that course. Those
influences are at least in part derived from the potential repeal of estate
and generation-skipping transfer taxes, recent bankruptcy legislation,
and the status of the federal/state Medicaid program. Among the
observations presented is the idea that these ideological and federal
concerns push in multiple directions, often at the same time and in a
conflicting manner, with a very uncertain but potentially significant
effect on the evolution of trust asset protection.
With regard to the diverse and divergent directions of evolving
trust asset protection law, one final point bears mentioning in relation to
the structure of this Article. There has been some divergence, if not
tension, between the recent academic and more practice-oriented
writings on trust asset protection. 13 In light of practitioner claims that
13 Professor Lischer captured the essence of this tension in a recent article, where he noted
that much of the practice-oriented literature has come from those promoting asset protection trusts
in connection with their utilizing them for their clients. Henry J. Lischer, Professional
Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset Protection Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561,
2006] 2625
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"proclamations from the ivory tower" are "unhelpful," it might be
tempting in this regard to analogize to the early spendthrift trust
debate. 14  There, the practical reality of widespread and rapid
acceptance of such trusts overshadowed Professor Gray's nineteenth
century expressions of outrage over those protections. 15 In the context
of the matters discussed here, however, separating the theoretical from
the practical would be misguided, if not impossible. At the outset, for
example, a blend of academic, theoretical, and practical concerns both
motivated and guided the UTC and Restatement (Third) projects. 16 As
the exploration here progresses from the bases and nature of those
reform projects, to local politics affecting their implementation, to the
more pervasive area of federal legislation and the popular concerns that
might affect its course, this Article similarly ventures between matters
of policy and equity as affected by, or as affecting, practical
circumstances and outcomes. The development of this Article,
therefore, in many ways mirrors the current evolution of the protective
concerns discussed here.
1. AN EXPLANATION OF "TRADITIONAL" TRUST PROTECTIONS
Creditor-protected trust variations have in common a beneficiary's
enjoyment of the underlying trust property via distributions from the
trust, coupled with some limitation or restraint upon the beneficiary's
ability to transfer-and creditors' rights to reach-the trust interest from
which that enjoyment derives. 17 Absent such a limitation, the
beneficiary would have full power to transfer her rights in the trust. 18
584-86 & nn.94-100 (2004). Professor Lischer then quotes one prominent practitioner as
claiming that "most of the articles written by law professors on this topic were 'Johnny-one-note
choruses of criticism" and "proclamations from the ivory tower," complaining finally that such
academic "authors' sensibilities and finely-honed sense of moral rectitude after years in the
academic community.., is simplistic, unhelpful, and unsupportable." Id. at 585 n.97 (quoting
Duncan E. Osborne & Jack E. Owen, Jr., Ethical, Civil, Criminal and Bankruptcy Issues Related
to Asset Protection Trusts: The Case for Asset Protection Planning, Presentation at the State Bar
of Texas 10th Annual Advanced Estate Planning Strategies Course (Apr. 1-2, 2004)). Professor
Lischer perhaps has the better of it, ultimately noting specific instances of courts discrediting
some of the asset protection trust (APT) proponents' literature.
14 The quoted language is from Osborne & Owen, supra note 13.
15 See supra note 4 and the accompanying text regarding this aspect of the early spendthrift
trust debate. For characterizations of Gray's outspoken criticism of spendthrift trusts as a
"tirade," "bitter renunciation," and other terminology, see Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts:
It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 180 (1993).
16 Even a cursory glance at the members of the UTC drafting committee members list reveals
a strong academic presence, coupled with input from members of the practicing bar.
17 See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 543-44 (7th ed.
2005); Emanuel, supra note 15, at 183.
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56, pt. 4, introductory note (2001). Thus, for
example, the beneficiary could transfer her right to receive distributions of income from the trust,
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Her creditors would likewise be able to force an involuntary transfer of
that trust interest.' 9 Trust "asset protection" comes into play when the
settlor structures the trust so that the beneficiary, her assignees, and her
creditors are denied the ability to effect a transfer of the beneficiary's
trust interest.20
A settlor might, for example, subject the trust to a provision that
expressly denies the beneficiary any right to transfer her trust interest,
either voluntarily or involuntarily at the behest of creditors. A trust
subjected to this type of direct restraint is called a "spendthrift trust."'2'
A spendthrift trust protects the beneficary's interest even where the trust
mandates distributions to that beneficiary. 22
A settlor might alternatively craft an indirect restraint that protects
the beneficiary's interest. The settlor might provide, for example, that
the beneficiary's interest simply terminates upon a creditor's attempt to
attach the interest, but this would be counterproductive to the settlor's
purpose of providing a lasting benefit to the trust beneficiary. 23 Settlors
therefore often take the approach of granting the trustee discretion to
but could not transfer any legal interest in the underlying trust property by virtue of which income
is earned in support of such distributions. In other words, absent some express trust provision to
the contrary, the beneficiary lacks any legal authority to transfer the underlying trust property
directly and free of the trust. Absent the grant of powers of appointment to others, that authority
instead resides with the trustee.
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 153 (1959). For a good explanation of the
manner in which a creditor might actually liquidate or realize upon the value of a beneficiary's
unprotected interest in a trust, see EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 627 (6th ed. 2000).
20 This characteristic sometimes arises by operation of law or some presumption of settlor
intent, as opposed to any specifically expressed intent of the settlor.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmts. b-c. A spendthrift restraint might be
included in the trust instrument as an expression of the trust settlor's intent that the beneficiary's
interest be so restricted and thus protected, or the provision might apply, for example, by
operation of some statute or presumption that deems the particular type of trust at issue to be
subject to a spendthrift restraint. The anti-alienation characterization reflects the fact that such
provisions present a direct restraint on the ability to alienate an interest in property, which
restraints are in most other instances void. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985) (discussing
restraints on alienation).
22 Of course, the spendthrift restraint only applies to the trust interest; once property is
distributed from the trust and into the hands of the beneficiary, that property becomes subject to
the claims of the beneficairy's creditors. For a further explanation of how creditors might
anticipate or otherwise recover against an unprotected trust interest, see SCOLES ET AL., supra
note 19, at 627.
23 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 150 (describing and recognizing such a
forfeiture provision as valid); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 150 (discussing forfeiture
provisions). A variation on this theme is the "protective trust," whereby upon creditor action, the
beneficiary's interest converts from one calling for mandatory distributions to one pursuant to
which the trustee is granted discretion to make distribution among any of a group of beneficiaries,
of which group the protected beneficiary is a member. Id. The term "protective trust" may be
used in this Article, however, to denote the more general idea of a trust that includes features
designed to protect the beneficiary's trust interest from creditor claims.
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make distributions if and to the extent the trustee deems appropriate. 24
This type of "discretionary trust" provides a degree of protection from
the beneficiary's creditors by virtue of the nature of the beneficiary's
interest.25 In this regard, courts and commentators have sometimes
described the beneficiary as having no "right" to receive a distribution
except upon the trustee's discretionary decision to make such a
distribution. 26 Traditional analysis often describes the beneficiary as
having only a "mere expectancy" of receiving distributions, which
interest is then said to fall short of the "property" right required for
alienation (whether voluntary or at the behest of creditors) to be
possible.27
A variation on this idea is the "support trust." A support trust is
one that guides (i.e., limits) by some standard the trustee's discretion in
making distributions. 28  Commonly encountered standards include
requiring that distributions be made as necessary to satisfy the
beneficiary's support, educational, general maintenance, and/or
healthcare needs. A support trust traditionally affords a degree of
protection, because any distribution (to either the beneficiary or a
24 In order to be effective against creditors the discretion must include the right to withhold
distributions entirely, and not relate simply to the timing or manner of payment. Where the
trustee has full discretion to withhold distributions, the trust is sometimes called a "purely"
discretionary trust. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 155.
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154 cmt. b, 155 cmt. b (describing that in
"support trusts" and "discretionary trusts" it is the inherent "nature of the beneficiary's interest
rather than a provision forbidding alienation which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary's
interest"); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 154 (same).
26 See Twopeny v. Peyton, 59 Eng. Rep. 704 (1840), and other cases cited in SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 155, at 152 n.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. b;
Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 11, 24-25 (1994). For a contrary view, see the text accompanying infra Parts
IlI.B. 1.
27 See generally SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 155 (discussing protection afforded by
virtue of the nature of the interest as discretionary); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 228 (rev. 2d ed. 1992) (same). The
traditional view of discretionary trust protections was grounded in the notions that (i) a
beneficiary could not compel a trustee to exercise the trustee's discretion so as to make
distributions; (ii) a beneficiary's creditors could only step into the shoes of the beneficiary upon
attaching a trust interest; and therefore (iii) a beneficiary's creditors could not compel a
distribution from a purely discretionary trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. b
("[B]ut the transferee or creditor cannot compel the trustee to pay anything to him, because the
beneficiary could not compel payment to himself or application for his own benefit.");
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 17, at 544 ("The creditor cannot, by judicial order, compel the
trustee of a discretionary trust to pay him. The theory is that, because the beneficiary has no right
to a payment, neither does the beneficiary's creditor."). As the UTC and Restatement (Third)
project drafters are quick to point out, however, this is inaccurate in the purest sense.
Specifically, even where the settlor grants "sole and absolute" discretion to the trustee, the
trustee's decisions are always subject to judicial reversal if made arbitrarily or in bad faith. See
infra text accompanying notes 108-109.
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154.
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creditor) that is outside the scope of the specified standard would
exceed the trustee's authority and would therefore be prohibited. 29
The protection afforded by a support trust is not as strong as in the
case of a purely discretionary trust, however. Among other reasons,
creditors of a support trust beneficiary may be able to force a
distribution in satisfaction of claims relating to the provision of goods or
services contemplated by the specified standard-a standard not present
in the case of a pure discretionary trust. 30 On the other hand, courts
have sometimes had difficulty distinguishing the two types of trusts, and
a third or "hybrid" trust emerged. 31 A hybrid or "discretionary support
trust" couples an ascertainable standard with words of absolute
discretion.32 This hybrid trust presents special difficulties that courts
most often confront in the context of claims that the beneficiary's trust
interest in some way affects her entitlement to public assistance, such as
Medicaid. 33
Considering the noted trust protections together, discretionary and
support trust variations achieve some measure of asset protection
without regard to the inclusion of a spendthrift provision. The inclusion
of a spendthrift provision in a discretionary or support trust, however, is
desirable from an asset protection standpoint and commonly seen in
practice. 34 In this regard, the discretionary and spendthrift forms are
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmt. b; SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3,
§ 154; Marty-Nelson, supra note 26, at 24; see also Part III.B, infra.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157. For further elaboration on the protections
traditionally afforded discretionary versus support trust interests, see the text accompanying infra
Part III.B.
31 See Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 IOWA L. REV. 273, 277-
83 (1982) (defining and distinguishing creditors' rights in relation to discretionary, support, and
hybrid trusts); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1961) (considering, among other issues, the extent to which the trustee's
discretionary judgment should be subjected to judicial review-an issue of importance in the
context of creditors' rights, as discussed supra in this Part II and infra Part III.B.).
32 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 17, at 533, 544-45; JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND
TRUSTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 549-50, 563 (2ded. 2003).
33 See the discussion in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 reporter's note (2001); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2000); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 228-229.
34 For example, where the trustee has exercised discretion by deciding to make a distribution
or where the trustee's discretion is limited to the particular timing or manner of an otherwise
required distribution, the beneficiary's interest is vulnerable in the absence of a spendthrift
provision, as the prospect of payment to the beneficiary is no longer subject to the trustee's
absolute discretion to withhold payment. "Moreover, if the trustee of a discretionary trust without
a spendthrift or forfeiture clause is served with process by a creditor of the beneficiary, he will be
liable to the creditor if he thereafter exercises his discretion and elects to pay the beneficiary."
Marty-Nelson, supra note 26, at 28. If a discretionary or support trust includes a spendthrift
restraint (as should be the case where creditor-protection is a planning objective), the issue is
more easily resolved in that the restraint will preclude most creditor claims from attaching to the
trust interest in the first instance. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (dealing with
discretionary trust interests, and noting: "This section will have limited application .... Only if
the trust is not protected by a spendthrift provision, or if the creditor falls within one of the
exceptions to spendthrift enforcement.., does this section become relevant."); RESTATEMENT
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complimentary, frequently used in tandem, and often loosely equated in
terms of their general effect upon the rights of creditors. 35
Two final points are notable in prelude to the discussion which
follows. First, the widely accepted and longstanding common law rule
is that the protections described above are not available in the case of
self-settled arrangements. 36  "Self-settled" means that the same
individual is not only the settlor funding the trust, but also a trust
beneficiary eligible to receive distributions from the trust.37 In those
situations, courts have traditionally ignored a spendthrift provision and,
in the case of discretionary or support trusts, granted creditors access to
the maximum portion of the trust property available for distribution to
the settlor under the trustee's discretionary power.38 As noted above,
however, offshore trends have undermined previously widespread
domestic adherence to this creditor-friendly outcome.39
The second point implicates the criticisms alluded to in Part I,
above. Since the early days of spendthrift trust recognition, the policy
debate over the efficacy of protecting trust assets from the claims of the
beneficiary's creditors has been an ongoing one that even today lacks
any "consistent or enduring resolution. '40 Although many arguments
have been advanced over the course of this debate, the conflict generally
pits respect for a settlor's right to transfer her property subject to
limitations-such as "I give this interest to X, to the exclusion of X's
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a (dealing with discretionary trust interests, and noting: "The rule
does not apply if the beneficiary's interest is subject to a valid spendthrift restraint .... ); Rosen
& Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. VI.B.I.b ("[A] discretionary distribution provision should
always be accompanied by a spendthrift provision."); Emanuel, supra note 15, at 185 (noting how
the discretionary nature of a trust interest can compliment the protection afforded solely by virtue
of a spendthrift restraint).
35 See supra note 34; SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 152 ("[C]ourts do not always
clearly appreciate the distinction between spendthrift trusts and trusts for support and
discretionary trusts .... ); id. § 155.1 ("The fact that discretion is conferred on the trustee to
withhold income from the beneficiary may indicate an intention to prevent alienation, voluntary
or involuntary, of the beneficiary's interest.") (footnote omitted); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
27, § 228 ("The discretionary trust effects an indirect restraint on alienation .... ).
36 See sources cited supra note 8. The origins of this prohibition against self-settled trust
protections can be traced to at least 1487. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 156 (tracing
the origin of this rule to the 1487 Statute of King Henry VII, Stat. 3 Hen. VII, c.4, which voided
conveyances in trust for the use of the transferor). For a recent treatment of the subject which
challenges conventional doctrine, however, see Danforth, supra note 8, at 287.
37 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999); see also In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98, 102
(D. Conn. 1998) (defining self-settled trust as a trust created and (at least in part) funded by
someone who is included as a beneficiary of the trust). For the definition of "settlor," see supra
note 8
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); RESTATEMENT THIRD § 58 cmt. b
(2001).
39 See the text accompanying supra notes 6-8 and infra Part V.B regarding the offshore trust
movement.
40 A good overview of the policy debate can be found in the Reporter's Note to Restatement
(Third) § 58.
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creditors"-against public policy concerns deemed sufficiently
important to trump the settlor's wishes. An early and general concern,
for example, was that competent people should not have the right to
enjoy property while avoiding their just debts. 41 For practical purposes,
however, such general objections failed to take hold,42 and adherence to
the settlor's rights argument can be seen in modern decisions upholding
trust protections.43 As Erwin Griswold noted, this protective outcome
represents a policy choice, as opposed to a conclusion that must
logically flow from the implicated legal principles. 44 The choices that
continue to be made in that regard today find us with:
[A] general acceptance of [the] fundamental common-law principle
that a property owner, being free either to bestow property rights and
benefits upon others or to withhold them, can bestow those rights
and benefits through the trust device with the settlor's chosen
conditions and restraints so long as those conditions and restraints
are not, in the conventional terminology of trust law, unlawful or
contrary to public policy.45
In light of this truth, the debate has in more recent years focused
upon the more specific question of which (if any) creditors have claims
that are so compelling that public policy demands the elevation of those
claims above respect for the donor's rights to condition her transfer. 46
In any event, both the general policies and specific parameters of the
noted debate remain evident in the current developments that have
41 GRAY, supra note 4, at vii; see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii (1st ed. 1883) ("How far the law will allow a man to enjoy rights in
property which he cannot transfer, and which his creditors cannot take for their debts, is a
question becoming more and more frequent in this country."). It is not the purpose of this Article
to exhaustively repeat or directly revisit the arguments of Gray and others regarding the merits
and demerits of trust asset protection. Such arguments pro and con are addressed in scores of
scholarly articles and are summarized nicely in BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, § 223;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 reporter's note to cmt. a; and SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 3, § 152. Instead, the focus here centers more upon recent developments and their
implications for the noted debate, and vice-versa.
42 See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 4, at 1197 ("Courts and commentators overrode Professor
Gray's concerns without ever addressing them directly.").
43 See, e.g., Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082-83 (Ohio 1991). The court
there stated that "[t]he most important argument against spendthrift trusts is that they are unfair to
the beneficiary's creditors because they allow the beneficiary to enjoy the trust property without
paying his debts." The court then went on to deny this objection "both logically and as a matter
of policy." Id. The court also cited the freedom of disposition argument so articulately proffered
by Justice Miller in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), as "most persuasive." From this the
court went on to reason that prior Ohio precedent rejecting spendthrift trusts should be reversed.
Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1082.
44 GRISWOLD, supra note 8, § 554 ("There is no syllogistic basis for the spendthrift trust. If
such trusts are valid, it is not [inherently] because the owner of property may dispose of it as he
sees fit, but because the particular restriction in question is not contrary to public policy.").
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 12 introductory note.
46 See Newman, supra note 12, at 773 ("[T]he debate has not ended; rather, its focus has
shifted to determining which claims of creditors should be allowed to override the protection
generally afforded .. "); Emanuel, supra note 15, at 195 (same).
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begun to guide the direction of trust asset protection. The following
Part III addresses two of those developments.
II. LAW REFORM PROJECTS
The undertaking and completion of the UTC and Restatement
(Third) law reform projects will no doubt influence the parameters of
trust asset protection in the coming years. In particular, the growing
momentum behind the UTC, coupled with the UTC's explicit invitation
for state legislatures to examine exactly what their trust law is and
should be, may ultimately prove to be as significant as the bare
recommendations embodied in either project.47 As states tweak the
UTC to their own preferences and precedents in a conflicting era of
personal responsibility and creditor-defeating strategies, their choices
confirm that the historic debate over such protections endures-
although the parameters of that debate do seem to have shifted to the
question of who, among various creditors, should be allowed to pierce
the trust protections a settlor has adopted. In that regard, the reform
projects have likely defined a floor of asset protection, with some states
then opting to embrace even greater protections than those resulting
from years of coextensive study by both the UTC and Restatement
(Third) drafters.
This Part provides a brief explanation of the Restatement (Third)
and UTC projects, beginning with an explanation of the nature of and
motivations behind both. The Article then considers some of the areas
of divergence (as well as similarity) in the reform projects' provisions,
and in particular the sharp criticism those provisions have recently
evoked. Part IV ultimately provides insights into both the current and
47 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in
the United States, 15 TOLLEY'S TR. L. INT'L 65, 79 (2001), available at
http://www.astrea.com.ar/files/prologs/doctrina0157.pdf ("Codification necessarily puts matters
of law reform in issue, because the drafters are loath to reinvigorate in statute what they regard as
shortcomings in the existing law."). Although the context refers to the project drafters, the same
reasoning applies to members of state study committees and legislators. With regard to the
growing momentum behind the UTC, see Michelle W. Clayton, Uniform Trust Code 2005:
Legislative Process, Enactment Prospects and Healthy Debates, UTC NOTES (Nat'l Conf. of
Comm'rs on Unif State Laws), Winter 2004, at 1-4, available at
http://www.utcproject.org/utc/uploads/UTCnotesDecO4_print.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
At least 30 states have become involved with the UTC, either through enactment or evaluation.
Id.; see also David M. English, The Kansas Uniform Trust Code, 51 KANS. L. REV. 311, 311
(2003) (noting that thirty states were studying the UTC for enactment as of 2003). Professor
English is the Reporter for the Uniform Trust Code project. A synopsis of UTC adoptions and
considerations as of early 2005 can be found in Richard B. Covey & Dan T. Hastings, Recent
Developments, 39 U. MIAMI SCH. L. PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 127.1 (Tina
Hestrom Portundo ed., 2005).
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evolving status of trust asset protection by relating those projects to
noted trust protection developments of the last decade or so.
A. Nature and Purpose of Reform Projects
The drafting of the Restatement (Third) and UTC proceeded "in
close coordination." 48  Despite the relationship, however, the
Restatement (Third) and UTC are distinct in their nature and purpose.
A Restatement serves to collect and summarize the common law of
trusts, and where conflict among courts exists, to delineate what is
perceived to be the better rule. 49 Courts obviously look to their own
precedent first, but where such precedent is lacking or called into
question, the 1957 Restatement (Second) of Trusts has been a key-if
not the key-judicial resource. 50 The drafters of the most recent third
iteration of the Restatement of Trusts no doubt anticipate a natural
succession to that role. For reasons explained below, however, their
expectations may not be wholly satisfied in the area of creditors' rights.
The UTC is distinguishable from the Restatement (Third) in that
the UTC represents the first effort to provide a comprehensive uniform
model act on the substantive law of trusts. 51 The UTC drafters hope for
48 UNIF. TRUST CODE, Prefatory Note (2000). Two commentators count over 100 specific
references to the Restatement in the comments to the UTC. Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins,
How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts be Affected by the UTC?, 31 EST. PLAN. 478
(2004) [hereinafter Merric & Oshins Part 3]. The Merric and Oshins article is actually the third
part of a three part diatribe condemning the UTC and Restatement positions on creditors' rights.
The other two parts can be found at Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the
Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 EST. PLAN. 375 (2004) [hereinafter Merric & Oshins
Part 1], and Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, UTC May Reduce the Asset Protection of Non-Self-
Settled Trusts, 31 EST. PLAN. 411 (2004) [hereinafter Merric & Oshins Part 2]. The three articles
are available in combined form at http://www.oshins.com/pages/27/index.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2006)
49 English, supra note 47, at 313-14; Halbach, Jr., supra note 12, at 1881-82.
50 The Restatement (Second) was approved by the American Law Institute in 1957. Work on
the Restatement (Third) began in the late 1980s, with provisions relating to creditors' rights
finding approval in 1999. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note. With regard to the role of the
Restatements in formulating state law, see, for example, UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 cmt. ("To
determine the common law and principles of equity in a particular state, a court should look first
to prior case law in the state and into more general sources, such as the Restatement of
Trusts ...."); Robert F. Collins, Address at the 2004 NAELA Symposium, Hilton Head, South
Carolina: The Greater Asset Protection Self-Settled Special Needs Trusts (May 20-23, 2004)
(noting that Restatement (Second) § 156, dealing with the issue of the validity of spendthrift
trusts, is "ubiquitous," having been adopted by almost every state). Two other important general
sources are the treatises by SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, and BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 27. For a recent and relevant instance of a court looking to and then reversing its on
precedent with regard to spendthrift trusts, see Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077
(Ohio 1991).
51 UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note. There are also other, less comprehensive uniform acts
that pertain to trusts and their administration. Id.
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widespread state legislative adoption, and progress is being made
towards that goal. 5 2 The UTC drafters recognize, however, that states
may make changes to the UTC to conform it to local precedent or
policy.5 3 This is particularly so with regard to the creditors' rights
provisions appearing in UTC Article 5, which "were the most widely
debated" provisions of the UTC. 54
Uniformity thus did not alone drive the UTC project. As explained
by a leading trust law scholar and member of the UTC drafting
committee:
The impetus for drafting the Uniform Trust Code originally came
from relatively sparsely populated states. . . . Because the case law
on trusts in these jurisdictions is thin, planners have been troubled by
the lack of authoritative guidance on what the trust law of the state
is. The Code was meant to serve that need. As the drafting
progressed, however, the Code began to attract considerable interest
from advisory groups in states that have a mature trust law, as they
discovered how often the comprehensiveness of the Code exposed
gaps or could help cure defects in the local law.55
Despite the UTC's comprehensiveness, the drafters also
recognized that it would not be possible to legislate on every issue or
scenario. 56 The Prefatory Notes to the UTC therefore point out that the
UTC's provisions are to be supplemented by the common law of
trusts. 57 In fact, the UTC must generally be understood as an attempt to
codify that common law in much the same way that the Restatements
attempt to elucidate and advise on the common law. The UTC drafters
proceeded from notable case law, statutes previously adopted in some
states, and the major secondary sources that propound upon the
common law of trusts.5 8  This consultation included both the
Restatement (Second) and the (then) developing Restatement (Third).59
52 Id. As of July 31, 2005, fifteen states had adopted the UTC, and it was being studied by at
least that many additional states. See also supra note 47.
53 See Suzanne Brown Walsh et al., What is the Status of Creditors Under the Uniform Trust
Code, 32 EST. PLAN. 29, 31 (2005) ("The subject of creditors rights varies greatly from state to
state and, therefore, before enacting the UTC, many states make changes to conform the UTC to
their current law.").
54 English, supra note 47, at 333.
55 Langbein, supra note 47, at 79.
56 UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note ("The Uniform Trust Code, although comprehensive,
does not legislate on every issue. Its provisions are supplemented by the common law of trusts
and principles of equity.").
57 Id.; see also id. § 106 cmt.
58 UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code, at pt. I.G.,
available at http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_files/thumbs/course-materials/SL003-CHO1_thumb.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006) ("The primary source of trust law in most states is thus the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts and the multivolume treatises by Scott and Bogert."); see also SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 3; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27.
59 UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note. The Restatement Reporter's Notes are similarly liberal
in referencing the UTC.
2634 [Vol. 27:6
POLICY, LOGIC, AND PERSUASION
This partially explains, then, the more than 100 cross-references that
appear in the comments to the Restatement (Third) and UTC.60
Additional explanation can be found in the timing of both projects and
their drafters' shared intent to improve the status and understanding of
American trust law.
B. Change and Controversy
This UTC/Restatement sibling-like relationship from infancy to
current maturity has led to a general association of the two projects as
relatedly significant in the future (albeit now a bit more current)
development of modem trust law.61 On the other hand, the projects
have not been unquestioningly hailed as favorable to that development.
This is particularly true in the area of creditors' rights against beneficial
trust interests. More specifically, the projects have provoked unitary
criticism based on a perception that each serves to weaken common law
protections traditionally afforded trust beneficiaries against the claims
of their creditors. 62 Interestingly, however, the projects have not been
defended in tandem by their proponents on this issue. In fact, despite
the numerous associations that appear in the original UTC comments,
UTC proponents have of late expressly disclaimed similarity to the
Restatement (Third) on certain issues pertaining to creditors' rights.63
Appreciating these arguments begins by relating certain of the project
drafters' positions, to what is often understood to be the traditional
approach to variations on trust protection.
1. Discretionary and Support Trusts
One noteworthy position taken is the rather bold decision by both
projects' drafters to disavow the traditional distinction between
discretionary and support trusts for creditors' rights purposes. 64 Recall
that a "discretionary trust" is one under which the trustee is granted
60 Merric & Oshins Part 3, supra note 48, at 478.
61 See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 12, at 1881-82 (discussing Restatement (Third) and UTC
creditors' rights provisions); Dobris, supra note 1, at 551 n.51 & 575-77 (same); Merric & Oshins
Part 1, supra note 48 (same); Merric & Oshins Part 2, supra note 48 (same); Merric & Oshins
Part 3, supra note 48 (same).
62 See supra note 48; infra note 8 1; discussion infra Part 1I.B.2.
63 See infra Part III.B.5.
64 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 & cmt.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 & cmt. a &
reporter's note (2001). This disavowal does not affect the rights of beneficiaries to challenge a
trustee exercise (or nonexercise) of discretion. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 50 & 60. With regard to the traditional distinction, see supra Part 11.
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broad discretion in making distributions. 65 The support trust variation
guides (i.e., limits) by some standard the trustee's discretion in making
distributions.66 As noted above, support trust variations have therefore
traditionally suffered from the potential weakness that a provider of
necessaries-and in some states dependent spouses and children-
might be permitted to force a distribution because their claims are
sometimes said to fall within the purview of the standards that the
settlor sets to guide the trustee. 67 In that case, the trustee must make
distributions in an amount and at times that are reasonable in relation to
the standard.
Under the traditional approach, then, courts and planners generally
regarded the protection afforded a "pure" discretionary trust as being
greater than that afforded a support trust or a hybrid trust.68 For all
practical purposes, creditors' rights outcomes traditionally depended
upon a court's belief that a particular type of trust-discretionary,
support, or some blend of the two-had been created by the settlor, thus
leading to the protective consequences often associated with the
particular type of trust. Much litigation therefore focused on discerning
which discretionary trust variation the settlor intended.69 The project
drafters felt that these labels, as embodied in the Restatement (Second)
and decisions influenced thereby, were "arbitrary and artificial ... [as
well as] difficult ... and costly. .. to attempt to draw. '70  The
Restatement (Third) drafters specifically complained that the noted
legal analysis
65 See supra Part II.
66 See supra Part 1I.
67 See supra Part 11. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959) (stating
the rule that a creditor of a beneficiary of a discretionary trust cannot compel a distribution), with
id § 157 (listing creditors who are not prohibited from proceeding against a beneficiary's interest
in a spendthrift or support trust). DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 17, at 545 ("The traditional
view is that the beneficiary of a support trust [i.e., a trust which includes an ascertainable standard
to guide the trustee's distribution decisions] cannot alienate her interest. Nor can creditors of the
beneficiary reach the beneficiary's interest, except suppliers of necessaries may recover through
the beneficiary's right to support [Citing Restatement (Second) § 154]."). The textbook authors
go on to explain that "[u]nlike the case of a pure discretionary trust, however, there is authority
which holds that the beneficiary's children and spouse may enforce claims for child support and
alimony against the beneficiary's interest in a support trust." Id. Spouses and children are
sometimes excepted from the trust protections because the settlor's purpose to support the
beneficiary is deemed to include support of those relying upon the beneficiary for support. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e. An alternative explanation is simply that a
beneficiary should not be able to enjoy trust distributions while ignoring those to whom the
beneficiary owes a support obligation. See SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 157.1
(discussing rationales for allowing spouse and child creditors to recover against an otherwise
protected trust).
68 See supra Part II.
69 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 50, 60 & reporter's notes (noting this and
also noting the difficulties courts have in making these distinctions).
70 Id. § 60 & reporter's note.
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produce[s] dubious categorizations and almost inevitably different
results (based on fortuitous differences in wording or maybe a
"fireside" sense of equity) from case to case for beneficiaries who
appear, realistically, to be similarly situated as objects of similar
settlor intentions. 71
The drafters of both projects therefore concluded that the particular
label ascribed to a discretionary trust, regardless of any standard
present, should not dictate creditors' rights consequences. 72 Both the
UTC and Restatement (Third) thus provide that a single rule should
govern creditors' rights in relation to any discretionary trust interest. 73
The drafters were convincing in their rationales and support for their
position. Yet criticism arose because of the creditors' rights
consequences that were previously believed to attach to the now
abandoned discretionary-support trust labels.74
2. Criticism
Critics assailed the drafters' position and argued that by
abandoning the distinction between discretionary and support trusts, the
project drafters similarly eliminated the distinct protection traditionally
afforded the pure discretionary trust.75 Critics worried that the UTC and
Restatement (Third) also served to liberalize the standard by which
71 Id
72 Id.; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 & cmt (2000).
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 & reporter's note; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 &
cmt. Since most trusts today include a spendthrift provision, and since a spendthrift provision
precludes all but the most favored (or "exception") creditors from recovering against the
beneficiary's trust interest regardless of its nature, the abolition of the discretionary/support trust
distinction is most relevant in the case of claims by the most prevalent of those special
creditors-namely, children, (ex)spouses, and government entities where public benefits (e.g.,
Medicaid) are at issue. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, § 222 n.7 ("It is common
knowledge that nearly all trust instruments which are prepared by lawyers in fact contain
spendthrift clauses.").
74 See supra notes 25-31 and the accompanying text for an explanation of the protections
traditionally associated with these discretionary trust variations, based upon the particular nature
of the beneficiary's interest.
75 See UTC National Committee Evaluates Concerns, UTC NOTES (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs
on Unif. State Laws), Winter 2004, at 4, available at http://www.utcproject.org/
utc/uploads/UTCnotes Dec04_print.pdf (noting "claims made regarding the asset protection
aspects of the UTC made in both Trust & Estates and Estate Planning magazines as well as on
some estate planning online listserves"); see also Merric & Oshins Part 1, supra note 48 (three-
part practitioner-authored series condemning the UTC & Restatement (Third) positions regarding
asset protection); Merric & Oshins Part 2, supra note 48 (same); Merric & Oshins Part 3, supra
note 48 (same); Mark Merric, Robert D. Gillen, and Jane Freeman, Malpractice Issues and the
Uniform Trust Code, 31 EST. PLAN. 586 (2004) (similarly condemning perceived lessening of
creditor protections); Mark Merric & Douglas W. Stein, A Threat to All SNTs: in UTC
Jurisdictions, Government Agencies Can Now Tap Into Supplemental Needs Trusts that Lack
Special Needs Language, 143 TR. & EST. 38 (2004).
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courts are to review (and possibly direct) trustee discretion. The
specific complaint was that by abolishing the distinction between
discretionary and support trusts, the trustee's discretion for all such
trusts becomes subject to a more demanding "reasonableness" standard,
and therefore becomes more easily subject to judicial compulsion. 76
Claiming "radical changes to the common law.., are adopted by both
the UTC and the Restatement Third" in this regard, 77 the critics
vociferously condemned the projects:
The Restatement Third adopts a substantially similar approach to that
of the UTC by imposing a reasonableness standard of review for a
discretionary trust. In this respect, the Restatement Third is in no
sense a restatement of the current law of trusts. As related to the
common law of almost all states, the Restatement Third is a
complete rewrite of history in this area.78
In the eyes of the critics, then, both projects exposed even "pure"
discretionary trusts to the claims of dependent spouses, children, and the
government in public benefits cases. In fact, the critics were so
convinced of this that they alleged that a failure to advise clients about
the decrease in asset protection in states adopting the UTC could result
in malpractice liability.79
3. Response
Among other forums, the primary criticisms appeared in a three
part diatribe published in late 2004 in the prominent practitioner journal,
Estate Planning.80 Placing such allegations before the estate planning
bar has led some practitioners to conclude that the trust asset protection
landscape faces a fundamental shift in favor of creditors wherever the
76 In other words, the beneficiary no longer has a "mere expectancy" because she can force a
distribution if to do so would be reasonable, and thus, so can her creditors. Protection for such
trusts would therefore become more dependent upon spendthrift language and not the particular
nature of the beneficiary's interest. The protections afforded a spendthrift trust are sometimes
subject to the exceptions noted in Part IV, infra.
77 Merric & Oshins Part 2, supra note 48, at 421.
78 Merric & Oshins Part 3, supra note 48, at 486. For a recent analysis of how Restatement
articulations may not accurately reflect judicial precedent, see Danforth, supra note 8.
79 Merric & Oshins Part 3, supra note 48, at 486; Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 36.
80 For other similarly-authored and similarly-critical articles, see supra notes 48, 75. What
might be described as the "Merric" view has received broad circulation, appearing not only in the
noted practitioner journals, but also in other widely-seen forums. See, e.g., Steven J. Oshins,
Asset Protection Other Than Self-Settled Trusts: Beneficiar. Controlled Trusts, FLPs, LLCs,
Retirement Plans and Other Creditor Protection Strategies, 39 U. MIAMI SCH. L. PHILIP E.
HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 300 et. seq. (Tina Hestrom Portundo ed., 2005); Ashlea
Ebeling, The Great Trust Rebellion, FORBES, Aug. 16, 2004 ("Merric and other renegades say the
code compromises families' privacy, endangers their estate plans and favors their creditors. The
rebels are winning some battles.").
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UTC and Restatement (Third) take hold.81 Perhaps in part because of
this, members of the UTC National Committee responded directly to the
public criticisms. Specifically, members of the UTC National
Committee in February, 2005, used the same Estate Planning
publication, as well as other forums, to communicate a point by point
rejoinder to each of the critics' arguments.82  Employing strong
language, the UTC proponents contend that the criticisms are based
upon "misinterpretations of the UTC, a disregard of pertinent UTC
provisions, or a misunderstanding of existing law. '83 In one forum, the
UTC proponents described the criticisms as "scare tactics. '84 In another
forum, the UTC Reporter faulted critics for "criticiz[ing] the
Restatement [Third] ... and then assum[ing] that the UTC is the same."
The UTC proponents' rejoinder appears to have the better of it,
ultimately concluding that "[t]he UTC will actually do the opposite of
what the critics assert; it will increase the creditor protection of most
trusts in most states. '85 This, by and large, appears to be true.
4. Understanding (and Distinguishing) the UTC and
Restatement (Third)
UTC proponents posit many specific arguments in defense of the
UTC, as much elaboration has been required in order to address the
criticisms. A synthesis of those arguments reveals four simple points
worthy of emphasis here. First, the UTC codifies the traditional
81 See supra note 80. Consider also the following excerpt from one law firm's website, which
reflects the penetration of the view expressed by Merric and others:
North Carolina is considering adoption of the Uniform Trust Code. The Uniform Trust
Code may be perceived as overturning 100 years of trust law and eliminates the
difference between discretionary and support trusts. If North Carolina adopts the UTC
without modification, the new trust law would likely eliminate the foundation on which
much special needs trusts, Medicaid trusts and asset protection planning is based.
Under the UTC, a beneficiary now has a right to sue the trustee for reasonableness in
making distributions. A beneficiary had virtually no right under current law, the
standard is bad faith. Under the UTC (if adopted), there is [sic] reasonableness
standard. The question then becomes: With the elimination of the prior asset protection
for discretionary trusts, does a creditor now have the right to sue for a distribution?
See http://www.strausslaw.com/Intro Asset Protection.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
82 See, e.g., Walsh et al., supra note 53; US Trust Law Experts Respond to Attack on Uniform
Trust Code, available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCresponse FebO4.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2006).
83 Walsh et al., supra note 53. In a separate forum, the UTC proponents similarly condemned
the critics for their alleged "mischaracterizations and misinformation about the UTC and about
American trust law in general." US Trust Law Experts Respond to Attack on Uniform Trust
Code, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCresponse FebO4.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
84 US Trust Law Experts Respond to Attack on Uniform Trust Code,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCresponseFebO4.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
85 Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 30.
2006] 2639
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
common law rule affirming the protections afforded by spendthrift
provisions-as well certain exceptions to those protections already
recognized in many states. 86 Second, the UTC's pronouncement that a
trustee must exercise discretion in good faith does not change the
common law, even with respect to the "purest" discretionary trusts. 87
Third and also relevant to discretionary trusts, the UTC is quite clear in
stating that (with one categorical exception discussed below), "a
creditor of a beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject to
the trustee's discretion, even if... the discretion is expressed in the
form of a standard ... or ... the trustee has abused the discretion. '88
Fourth and finally, any contrary impressions created by the provisions
and commentary of the Restatement (Third) are inapposite, as the
Restatement (Third) and UTC differ on important points regarding
creditors' rights. 89
5. Disassociation
Elaboration is necessary to appreciate these four points in the
context of the future course of trust asset protection. Taking the last
point first, the recent efforts by the UTC proponents to distance the
UTC from the Restatement (Third) on the subject of creditors' rights
could be telling as to the directions these projects might lead.
Specifically, in rebutting critics claims, the UTC proponents have been
careful to note that:
Some critics.., treat the UTC and the Restatement Third as if they
were one unified whole .... The two-although each is important
in its own right-do not serve the same purpose, and not only are not
identical, but are quite divergent on a number of important points. 90
86 This is the author's effort to state the arguments succinctly. For a perspective more intent
on defending the UTC and more detailed in the assertions made, see the sources cited at supra
notes 47 & 90.
87 Regarding the traditional view of discretionary trust protections, see supra notes 23-35 and
the accompanying text.
88 UNiF. TRUST CODE § 504(b) (2000). Although a creditor might still be able to attach a
discretionary interest that is not accompanied by spendthrift language, the creditor (with the
exception noted in Part III.B.6., infra), would be precluded from actually "busting" the trust by
compelling a distribution in the creditor's favor. Although the creditor could in this situation cut
off the beneficiary's right to receive distributions-an important bargaining tool favoring the
creditor-it is unlikely that a discretionary trust in practice would be unaccompanied by the
simple formality of spendthrift language. See supra notes 34-35; Walsh et al., supra note 53, at
31. Thus, the discussion here focuses on the general right to compel distributions. With regard to
the noted categorical exception, see infra Part III.B.6.
89 See infra Part III.B.5.
90 Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 31. The UTC Reporter has also characterized UTC
criticisms as improperly "conflat[ing] the UTC and the Restatement Third together, criticiz[ing]
the Restatement, and then assum[ing] that the UTC is the same. The creditor provisions of the
2640 [Vol. 27:6
POLICY, LOGIC, AND PERSUASION
The two works may indeed have distinctly different impacts
where followed. As noted above, UTC section 504 is clear in providing
only one categorical exception to its express rule that creditors may not
"step into the beneficiary's shoes" and exercise that beneficiary's right
to compel a distribution from a discretionary trust (of any type). 91
Regardless of the beneficiary's right to compel and regardless of the
standard used to judge whether compulsion is warranted, therefore, the
UTC simply and unequivocally denies creditors any such right.92 Thus,
the abolished distinction between discretionary and support trusts does
not empower creditors to compel distributions from any discretionary
trust variation under the UTC. 93
The Restatement (Third), however, is much less definitive in
delineating its position on this issue. The Restatement (Third) could
even be read to suggest, as critics claim, a broadening of creditors'
rights in the context of a discretionary trust. More specifically,
Restatement (Third) section 60 provides that a discretionary trust
beneficiary's creditors--of whatever variety of trust or creditor-may
"receive or attach any distributions the trustee makes or is required to
make. '94  The comments to that section elaborate upon this right, but
have difficulty deciding exactly when the right might be meaningful:
A... creditor ... cannot compel the trustee to make discretionary
distributions if the beneficiary personally could not do so. It is rare,
however, that the beneficiary's circumstances, the terms of the
discretion[] ... and the purposes of the trust leave the beneficiary so
powerless. The exercise or nonexercise of fiduciary discretion is
always subject to judicial review to prevent abuse ... [and] the rights
of a discretionary beneficiary's ... creditor are also entitled to
judicial protection .... On the other hand, a trustee's refusal to
make distributions might not constitute an abuse as against
a[] . . . creditor .... 95
UTC and the Restatement Third are very different." David English, The UTC and Crummey
Powers, UTC NOTES (Nat'l Conf. of Comrn'rs on Unif. State Laws), Winter 2004, at 7, available
at http://www.utcproject.org/utc/uploads/UTCnotesDec04_print.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
91 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(b). With regard to the one exception, see the text infra Part
II.B.6. For statements of the traditional view that a creditor merely steps into the beneficiary's
shoes, see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
92 Again and for purposes of both accuracy and clarity, there is one categorical exception to
this rule, as discussed at infra Part III.B.6.
93 See discussion infra Part III.B.6.
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2001).
95 Id. § 60 cmt. e. The Reporter's Note to comments b and c understates the Third
Restatement's significant departure from the traditional conception of asset protection with
respect to discretionary trust interests: "These Comments, and the basic rule of [section 60] are
consistent with Restatement Second, Trusts § 155 (on discretionary trusts); but they give effect to
assignments and attachments in a way that id. § 155 would not .... " Id. cmt. b & c, reporter's
note (emphasis added). The Reporter's Note goes on to describe the argument that such interests
would be protected in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000) as "dubious" and "wrong."
Id.; see infra notes 234-243 and the accompanying text with respect to § 541(c)(2). Cf In re
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In non-UTC states, courts looking to the Restatement (Third) for
guidance on the rights of creditors in relation to a discretionary trust
interest are likely to find the matter no more satisfying than was
formerly the case with attempts to distinguish discretionary trusts from
support trusts.96  Courts looking at similar facts today could-
notwithstanding abolition of the discretionary trust distinctions under
the Restatement (Third)--easily reach very different conclusions on the
protection or exposure of these interests to creditor claims.97  The
observations of one seemingly neutral group of textbook authors
support this conclusion: "[i]f the drafters of the Restatement [Third]
wanted to kill the asset protection features of discretionary trusts, then
they should have come out and said so. Instead, they fuzzed up the law,
which will invite litigation. '98
The Restatement (Third) may have therefore made little progress in
refining the issue of creditors' rights regarding discretionary trust
interests, despite the project's stated abolition of the
discretionary/support trust distinction. The UTC, in contrast, provides
clarification and certainty on the issue of creditors' rights in such
trusts.99 That certainty appears to work to the distinct disadvantage of
creditors, particularly with regard to discretionary trusts that are other
than "purely" discretionary. This is because the UTC is straightforward
in denying most creditors a right to compel a distribution from any
variation of the discretionary trust. 00
Blackwell, 142 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) ("Thus, until that [discretionary
distribution] decision is made, the pension trust is tantamount to a spendthrift trust such that the
property would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate."). Consistent with the language quoted
in the text supra, the Restatement (Third) drafters struggle throughout the referenced comment
and the Reporter's Note to comment e, to state simply what the newly articulated creditor's rights
might actually mean in terms of practical implementation.
96 See the text accompanying supra notes 31-32 and 68-74 regarding the difficulties in
distinguishing discretionary trusts from support trusts.
97 The Restatement (Second), in contrast, clearly stated that creditors were precluded from
compelling a distribution from a discretionary trust. In the case of support trusts, by contrast, the
Restatement (Second) provides that creditors may compel a distribution in satisfaction of their
claim, where the claim relates to satisfying the support standard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 154, 155 (1959). With regard to courts reaching different results on similar facts
under the Restatement (Second) distinction based on discretionary versus support trust status, see
the text accompanying supra notes 68-74.
98 DUKEMrNIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, TEACHER'S MANUAL 8-32 (7th ed.
2005) [hereinafter DUKEMINIER ET AL., TEACHERS' MANUAL].
99 See text accompanying supra note 91.
100 See supra note 97 and the text accompanying supra notes 23-33 and 88 regarding the
ability of creditors to compel a distribution from a support trust.
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6. Creditor Caveat
An important caveat to the foregoing UTC explanation should not
be overlooked, however. Specifically, the UTC embraces several
exceptions to the protections afforded by both spendthrift clauses and
discretionary interests. 10 1 In responding to criticisms on this point, UTC
proponents emphasize that the recognized exceptions "are [already]
reflected in statutes or case law in most jurisdictions."' 02
With respect to discretionary trusts, the UTC identifies dependent
spouses, former spouses, and children as potential judgment creditors
having the power to compel a distribution from a discretionary trust.10 3
Regardless of whether or not their claims were previously recognized in
most states, these are not unimportant creditors. Their claims have the
potential to be substantial and ongoing. Critics who contend that the
growing UTC movement threatens the protections traditionally afforded
discretionary trust interests are therefore to some extent correct, at least
in states formerly following the Restatement (Second) view and not
previously recognizing (or addressing) exceptions to that protection. 0 4
Ultimately, however, the UTC position simply represents a logical
implementation of a public policy choice favoring a class of dependent
creditors over a settlor's protective intentions, as embodied in the
chosen discretionary trust structure. 0 5
Furthermore, beyond the bounds of the noted exception for
dependent spouses and children, the protections afforded discretionary
trusts (of whatever traditional variety) are solid under the UTC
formulation. And even with regard to spouse and child creditors, the
compelled distribution is limited under the UTC to "such amount as is
equitable," and in no event more than what the beneficiary would
herself have been entitled to in the trustee's proper exercise of
discretion. 10 6 Further still, and consistent with the traditional view that
a creditor at best steps into the shoes of the beneficiary, spousal and
child creditors may only compel a distribution where the trustee has
failed to comply with some standard guiding distributions, or where the
101 The exceptions are set forth in UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 503, 504 (2000).
102 Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 29; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (spendthrift
exceptions recognized elsewhere); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 reporter's note to
cmt. e (2001) (discretionary trust exceptions recognized elsewhere); Walsh et al., supra note 53,
at 31 ("[T]he assertion that no creditor can reach a discretionary trust is not the rule in every
state."). For criticisms, see the sources cited supra notes 48 and 75.
103 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c). The spouse or child must have an order or judgment for
support that she seeks to enforce.
104 The Restatement (Second) position is described supra notes 27-33 and the accompanying
text.
105 With regard to public policy and settlor intentions, see the text accompanying supra notes
40-46.
106 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c)(2).
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trustee has otherwise abused its discretion. 107 These creditors are not,
therefore, simply given carte blanche to access the trust for satisfaction
of their claims.
As to the critics' claim that a state's adoption of the UTC will
enhance creditors' rights by virtue of the UTC's inclusion of a good
faith standard for judging a trustee's discretionary decisions, the
common law has always embraced some minimal "good faith" standard,
though perhaps expressed in different ways.108 No trustee is or ever has
been beyond judicial supervision, regardless of how broadly the settlor
has worded a grant of discretion. 10 9 In any event, the express bar to all
but dependent creditors compelling distributions, as set forth in UTC
section 504(b), diminishes the relevance of this standard to the universe
of other creditors.
So even in states where adoption of the UTC would in fact change
prior law (or prior reliance on the contrary Restatement (Second)
position), the change falls short of a radical undoing of discretionary
trust protections. In laying a foundation for a straightforward and
analytically sound approach to creditors rights, a state's adoption of the
UTC will at worst clarify a previously troublesome area of law.
Clarification is not a weakening of common law protections, except
perhaps to those who find solace in confusion and the ability to mold
the "fuzzed up" law to a particular beneficiary's facts." 0 Beyond that,
the only complaint that seems to have real traction is disagreement with
the drafters' decision to include spouse and child claimants as exception
107 Id. § 504(c).
108 Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 29. One group of leading textbook authors puts it this way:
The traditional view, aptly summarized by the excerpt from the Scott treatise at page
544, is that the beneficiary does not have a property interest even though the
beneficiary can bring suit to compel payment to him if the trustee's failure to do so is
in bad faith. This is the odd thing about the standard conception of the beneficiary's
interest in a discretionary trust as "no property right." If the trustee acts in bad faith,
the beneficiary can reach some of the income or principal. As we saw in the prior
section, the beneficiary always has the right to challenge the trustee's failure to make a
payment, no matter the extent of the trustee's discretion (albeit the intensity of the
court's scrutiny will be less if the trustee is vested with extended discretion). So
perhaps we should say that the beneficiary has no property interest that his creditors
can reach, but the beneficiary can compel the trustee to do its duty.
DUKEMINIER ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 98, at 8-31. With regard to the UTC's
embracing a "good faith" standard for judging trustee discretionary actions, see the comment to
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a), wherein it is provided that "[a] grant of discretion establishes a
range within which the trustee may act. The greater the grant the broader the range."
109 See supra note 108; Langbein, supra note 47, at 77 ("A trust whose terms authorise bad
faith performance is not a trust; it is illusory, because it undercuts the requirement that there be
enforceable duties, and that the trust be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.").
110 For the assertion that the Restatement (Third) has "fuzzed up the law" regarding creditors'
rights in discretionary trust interests, see the text accompanying supra note 98. For difficulties
relating to the traditional distinction between discretionary and support trust, see the text
accompanying supra notes 27-35 and supra Part III.B. 1.
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creditors in the case of all variations of the discretionary trust.11 Again,
that is a matter of policy preference, not of logic in the sense that
unyielding protections must follow from the nature of the trust.112 In
this regard, the nature of the interest is what the law says it is, and by
eliminating the often confusing distinction between purely discretionary
and other variations of that trust, the UTC improves the law. Again,
disagreement with the existence of exceptions or the degree of resulting
protections is simply a disagreement with a policy choice. Apart from
divergent opinions on the decisions that necessarily follow from that
choice, both academics and practitioners alike should regard this clarity
and focus as favorable to the development of trust asset protection.
7. The UTC in Operation
As to policy choices, however, the UTC is hardly prompting
wholesale abandonment of spendthrift and discretionary trust
protections-traditional or otherwise. As of July 31, 2005, fifteen
jurisdictions had adopted some version of the UTC. 1I 3 Most of those
jurisdictions have either rejected or modified the treatment of
discretionary trust protections embodied in UTC section 504. More
specifically, of the fifteen adopting jurisdictions, seven have chosen to
omit UTC section 504 in its entirety."l 4 An eighth jurisdiction adopted
the protective clarification that only a beneficiary can compel, without
including the spousal and child exceptions found in the UTC. 115 Four of
the remaining states have chosen to grant the right to compel only to
dependent children, rejecting the policy arguments equating spousal
claims.1 16 This latter position is interesting in that courts sometimes
explain the spousal and child support exceptions as based on the
premise that both claims reflect a beneficiary's duty, not a debt, and
I11 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c).
112 With regard to the traditional view that protections are inherent in the nature of a
discretionary trust, see supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
113 The term "jurisdictions" is sometimes used in lieu of "states," since the District of
Columbia is included among the fifteen jurisdictions that have embraced the UTC. The other
adopting jurisdictions are: Kansas, Wyoming, New Mexico, Nebraska, Utah, Maine, Tennessee,
New Hampshire, Missouri, Arkansas, Virginia, South Carolina, Oregon, and most recently, North
Carolina.
114 The jurisdictions are New Mexico, Kansas, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Oregon and the
District of Columbia. Links to an explanation of variations for each jurisdiction's UTC
enactment can be found at UTCproject.org, http://www.utcproject.org/utc/DesktopDefault.aspx
(last visited Apr. 13, 2006). As of the date of this writing, the North Carolina legislation was not
examined there, but can be found at North Carolina General Assembly-Senate Bill 679
Information/History (2005-2006 Session), http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2005&BillID=SB679 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
115 That state is Maine.
116 These states are North Carolina, Virginia, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
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public policy objects to someone enjoying trust benefits while
neglecting such duties.1 17 Yet, the twelve states that reject either all or
the spousal exceptions in UTC section 504 have made a straightforward
policy choice; namely, that the claims of all creditors (in eight states)
and spouses (in four additional states) are subordinate to the policy of
respecting the donor's intentions in creating the indirect protections
traditionally associated with a beneficiary's discretionary trust interest.
So viewed, this legislative conclusion raises a final but important point
about the UTC and its potential impact relative to the Restatement
(Third)-and indeed, relative to the common law itself.
C. The Legislative Dimension
Specifically, the UTC as adopted by a given state is a legislative
directive. The Restatement (Third), by contrast, can be viewed as
potentially influential, but ultimately merely advisory. Respected
representatives of the estate planning bar and the UTC National
Committee recently captured the importance of this distinction:
Restatements can be very persuasive in court proceedings in
jurisdictions with no rule on a certain point. On the other hand, once
a state enacts a uniform law, its judges must follow it, and any
Restatement dealing with that subject, if different, is not relevant.118
To emphasize a point not expressly stated in the forgoing, a state
legislature's enactment of the UTC not only limits judicial latitude in
the legislated area, but also trumps a state's existing judicial precedent,
to the extent that precedent is inconsistent. 19 Of course, the legislature
may embrace its state courts' precedent by incorporating consistent
rules within a chosen statutory scheme. With respect to states adopting
the UTC, judicial precedent also remains relevant for filling gaps and
117 See Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416 (Md. 2003) (denying recovery to tort claimants
because they are merely judgment creditors, and discussing the distinct nature of spousal and
child support claims).
118 Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 30. Interestingly, this comment was made in the specific
context of the recent push by UTC proponents to distance the UTC from the Restatement (Third)
on the matter of creditors' rights, as noted in the text supra Part III.B.5. The noted
representatives of the estate planning bar are four estate planning attorneys, each of whom bears
the distinguished and invitation-only status of American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
(ACTEC) Fellow. These four individuals are also members of the UTC National Committee,
which was formed in 2004 to consider issues relating to the UTC and its adoption nationally, and
which consists of the chairs of select state study committees as well as certain of the UTC's
drafting committee members. As to ACTEC, the organization's website explains its purpose and
membership ("Fellow") status. See American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, Information
on Our Members and Membership in ACTEC, http://www.actec.org/public/Memberlnfo.asp (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006).
119 Absent some constitutional or other negating infirmity, of course.
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understanding the legislation. 120 As explained in more detail below,
however, what the legislature fails to say can be as important to
legislative meaning as what the legislature specifically chooses to
include in its statutory directive. 121
III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: LOOKING BACK TO SEE AHEAD
The foregoing ideas should be kept in mind when contemplating
the likely future direction of trust asset protections in what could well
become a UTC world.12 2 As is often the case, however, we must
consider the past in light of what we perceive to be current trends if we
are to have any logical basis for appreciating future possibilities. 123 The
discussion which follows pursues such logic by placing several recent
trust asset protection developments in the context of the growing UTC
movement, thus tying the foregoing discussion together in two ways.
The first is demonstrative, as the remainder of this Part shows the
particular nuances of the interaction between judicial precedent,
Restatement guidance, and legislative directives in shaping trust asset
protection. Extrapolation from those lessons then allows conclusions to
be drawn as to how, why, and where the UTC is pushing the evolving
120 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
121 See Jackson v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (Va. 2005), for an application of
the Latin maxim expression unius est exclusio, which is "a canon of construction holding that to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." Of course,
the misxim has been criticized:
Several Latin maxims masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more
than describing results reached by other means. The best example is probably
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is a rather elaborate, mysterious sounding,
and anachronistic way of describing the negative implication. Far from being a rule, it
is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the
mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial
of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it
does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of
context. Without contextual support, therefore, there is not even a mild presumption
here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court
has discovered from context.
United States v. Mo. Valley Const. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Reed Dickerson,
The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 234-35 (1975)). On the other hand, the context of
a state's consideration of the UTC and adoption of that legislation without the proffered
exceptions is significant, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 145-149, infra.
122 In light of the numerous discussions of offshore versus domestic asset protection trusts,
precision perhaps suggests that I narrow this to a UTC country.
123 See, e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 8, § 9 ("[S]pendthrift trusts can be fairly looked upon as
the current development in this periodic movement in the law. The fate of similar restraints on
alienation in earlier stages of our legal history may indicate that limitations on the scope of
spendthrift trusts can be expected."); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 126 (1997) ("Because of the indeterminacy of the
normative arguments for and against various kinds of.. . reform, one must rely on experience and
history.").
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American trust asset protection environment. Again, conclusions in that
regard derive as much from the UTC drafters' proposition that states
examine their trust laws for possible codification, as from the technical
specifications actually embodied in the UTC's preferred rules. 124
Consideration of the past begins in 1997.125 In that year the
Mississippi Supreme Court decided Sligh v. First National Bank.2 6 The
decision and the responses it engendered are well-known among trust
and estate practitioners and scholars. Most briefly, Sligh involved a tort
judgment against the beneficiary of two spendthrift trusts. The tort
creditor-plaintiff, William Sligh, had suffered permanent paralysis and
other severe complications as a direct result of an automobile accident
caused by a drunken driver, namely, the spendthrift trust beneficiary. 127
Sligh sought satisfaction of his judgment by claiming against the
beneficiary's spendthrift trust interest because the beneficiary had no
other assets. 128
Typical of the development of the common law, the Sligh court
first noted its own precedent. Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme
Court had accepted the validity of spendthrift trust protections in 1892
by joining the growing list of states then accepting those trust
protections. 129 The Sligh court, however, faced the more focused
question of whether public policy now demanded an exception to those
protections in the case of tort-victim-creditors. More specifically,
should there be such an exception where the trust beneficiary's
124 This is in part because many states are, in fact, rejecting certain aspects of the UTC
creditors' rights provisions in favor of trust protections that are stronger than those envisioned by
the UTC drafters. See discussion supra Part III.B.6-7; see infra text accompanying notes 150-
154.
125 As to choice of year and the above promise of "recent" developments, it is enlightening to
consider "recent" in the context of the 130-plus year debate over the efficacy of the spendthrift
trust and the creditors' rights (or more descriptively, the lack of rights) such trusts entail. From
that perspective, developments in 1997 and beyond are readily considered "recent."
126 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997).
127 Id. at 1023. Sligh presented a compelling case, having suffered a broken spine, the loss of
use of both legs, the loss of sexual function, and the loss of the ability to control bladder and
bowel functions. Particularly egregious were facts suggesting that the beneficiary was "an
habitual drunkard... [who] regularly operated motor vehicles while intoxicated... [resulting in]
numerous automobile accidents." Id
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1024-25. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Miller's logical defense of spendthrift trust
protections as articulated in the 1875 U.S. Supreme Court decision Nichols v. Eaton is often
credited with starting a movement that by century's end saw the growing spread of spendthrift
trust acceptance. See Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875); John K. Eason, Developing the
Asset Protection Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 23, 36-42 (2003)
(exploring the role of the Nichols decision in the evolution of American spendthrift trust law). As
to the fluidity of the common law and the particular policy rationales it chooses to emphasize at
various times, see Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio 1991) (citing
Nichols and Justice Miller's freedom of disposition argument as proffered in Nichols as "most
persuasive" in reasoning that prior Ohio precedent rejecting spendthrift trusts should be reversed).
2006] POLICY, LOGIC, AND PERSUASION 2649
intentional or grossly negligent conduct led to the victim-creditor's
claim against the spendthrift trust?1 30
The idea that exceptions grounded in public policy might be
warranted can be traced to the earliest spendthrift trust decisions and
serve as a basis for much of the debate over asset protection trusts
generally. 131 Prior to Sligh, policy considerations led courts to articulate
several generally recognized exceptions to spendthrift trust protections.
The prohibition against protection for self-settled trusts or in cases of
fraud are longstanding examples. 132 Beyond that, some (but not all)
states had recognized a list of "exception" creditors"-a special group
of creditors who, by their nature or the nature of their claim, are
permitted to proceed against a beneficiary's trust interest
notwithstanding a spendthrift provision. 133 Public policy generally did
not, however, trump settlor intentions in the case of tort creditors.134
Having no past decisions of its own elaborating on the parameters
of spendthrift protections (beyond the then-standard denial of self-
settled protections), the Sligh Court consulted the list of exception
creditors proffered in Restatement (Second) section 157. Reflective of
the common law from which it derived, the "rule" of Restatement
(Second) section 157 did not list tort creditors among the excepted
class. Commentators, however, had previously suggested (and continue
today to suggest) that tort creditors, being involuntary in their dealings
with the trust beneficiary, should be added to the list of exception
creditors. 135 The Sligh Court emphasized these commentaries, and in
130 Common law statements of the spendthrift protective rule universally limit that protection
to instances where it would not be contrary to public policy.
131 In the influential 1882 decision Broadway National Bank v. Anna, 133 Mass. 170 (1882),
for example, the court justified recognition of spendthrift restraints by reference to respect for the
donor's intentions. That court stated the simple maxim that the settlor's "intentions ought to be
carried out, unless they are against public policy." Id. at 173. With regard to the debate over the
efficacy of trust protections, see the text accompanying supra notes 40-46.
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 & cmt. a (1959).
133 Id. § 157. The exception noted above for spouse and child claimants in the case of
discretionary trusts also represents this dynamic in action. See supra Part III.B.6.
134 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 reporter's note to cmt. a (2001)
(acknowledging that tort claimant exception as proposed by Erwin Griswold "has not generally
had much influence on legislation or judicial decisions"); Newman, supra note 12, at 800 (noting
that "most courts have declined to create such an exception" and citing authority); Laurene M.
Brooks, Comment, A Tort-Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: A Call to the
Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ L. REV. 109, 125 (1989) ("Cases addressing whether tort
creditors should be able to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust, although scarce,
overwhelmingly reject an exception for tort victims."), discussed in Emanuel, supra note 15, at
197-98; see also Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416, 422 (Md. 2003) (rejecting a tort creditor
exception).
135 See, e.g., SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 157.5 ("It may well be held that it is against
public policy to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to enjoy an income under a trust
without discharging his tort liabilities .... ); Newman, supra note 12, at 828 ("In this new
environment [where beneficiaries are often given substantial control over their trusts], the
question of whether tort creditors ... should be barred from reaching the [spendthrift trust]
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particular the opinion expressed in the comments to the Restatement
(Second) that:
The enumeration in this [Restatement (Second)] of situations in
which the interest of the beneficiary. .. can be reached is not
necessarily exclusive. The interest of a beneficiary ... may be
reached... if considerations of public policy so require. Thus, it is
possible that a person who has a claim in tort against the beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust may be able to reach [the beneficiary's]
interest. 136
From this the Sligh Court held that public policy demanded the
addition of tort victims to the list of exception creditors, at least where
the tort-feasor-beneficiary's conduct was intentional or grossly
negligent. 37 Such is the judicial process of the evolving common law
of trust asset protection. The Restatement (Third) carries forward this
process through its continued endorsement of the judicial flexibility
suggested in the just-quoted language.13 8
Judicial prerogative in the evolving law of trust asset protection is,
however, subject to limitation where decisions catch the legislature's
attention. In Mississippi, for example, the legislature disagreed with
Sligh-if not so much with the judicial latitude then certainly with the
ultimate conclusion weakening spendthrift trust protections in that state.
The legislature thus proceeded promptly to take control of the evolution
of such protections. 139 More specifically, the legislature effectively
overturned the Sligh decision by enacting a statute validating trust
protections, excepting only self-settled trusts. 140
The UTC will likely have the same effect in the jurisdictions where
it is adopted, even though many state courts will have never considered
the myriad facts that might implicate public policy relative to the
parameters of available trust protections. 14 This is because the UTC
provides a limited list of exception creditors. The UTC section 504
beneficiary's interest ... deserves reconsideration.").
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 cmt. a. The Restatement (Third) carries this
philosophy forward. Including tort creditors among the class of excepted creditors was clearly a
minority position both when the Restatement (Second) was approved and at the time of the Sligh
decision. See also supra note 134 regarding the lack of case authority for a tort creditor
exception.
137 Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, 1029 (Miss. 1997).
138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. a(2).
139 Some would view this as a favorable development. See infra note 155 and accompanying
text.
140 The Mississippi legislation is entitled the "Family Trust Preservation Act of 1998" and is
set forth at MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-501 (2005). The act did include an exception to trust
protection where the trust is self-settled. Id. § 91-9-509. The statute was clear, however, that this
was the only exception. Id. §§ 91-9-503, 9-507. As to the Mississippi legislation's "effectively"
overruling the Sligh decision, see Newman, supra note 12, at 801-03.
141 See Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416, 422 (Md. 2003) (noting "the paucity of authority on
the subject" of a tort creditor exception).
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exception creditor list in the case of discretionary trust interests
includes, as noted above, only dependent spouse and child claimants.
With regard to spendthrift trusts, the UTC identifies three classes of
exception creditors in section 503:
(1) a beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse who has a
judgment or court order against the beneficiary for support or
maintenance;
(2) a judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection
of a beneficiary's interest in the trust; and
(3) a claim of [the] State or the United States to the extent a statute of
[the] State or federal law so provides.142
Most importantly, and in contrast to the Restatement (Third)
position noted above, the UTC expressly provides that the identified
exception creditors are the only creditors who can pierce the protections
of a spendthrift provision. 143 This rules out more than simply a tort
creditor exception. For example, the trust interest of a beneficiary
acting in breach of her fiduciary duties would be immune from any
judicially discerned public policy exception-even where the claim is
one for recovery based upon a breach of duty while administering the
estate of the very settlor who created the trust! 144
Many legislatures considering the UTC, moreover, have chosen to
omit the UTC's entire list of exception creditors from their own
enactments, thus solidifying the sanctity of the spendthrift trust with
regard to all creditors, not just those who are victims of a beneficiary's
malfeasant conduct. In Arkansas, for example, prior to the legislature's
consideration of the UTC, Arkansas judicial precedent recognized an
exception to spendthrift protections in the case of spousal support
142 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 (2000). The second exception would cover, for example, "a
beneficiary's lawyer in trust litigation who has obtained a judgment against the beneficiary for
failing to pay the lawyer's fees." See, e.g., Valerie J. Vollmer, Simply Explained: UTC Artile 5
on Creditors' Rights, http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/estate/2004/2/Vollmar.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006). Though this exception is quite defensible, the UTC and Restatement
diverge on this'point. The Restatement omits the service provider exception and instead makes
an exception for claims by providers of necessaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59.
143 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(c); id. art. 5 gen. cmt. ("Unless a claim is being made by an
exception creditor, a spendthrift provision bars a beneficiary's creditor from reaching the
beneficiary's interest .. "); see also Walsh et al., supra note 53, at 33 ("[T]he UTC list of
exception creditors is exclusive."). Even without this proviso, the result would likely be the
same, because "[w]here the legislature has made specific exemptions, [courts] must presume no
others were intended." The quoted language is from a case in which a tort creditor exception was
denied, based primarily upon the court's feeling that the legislature had spoken on the topic, and
based upon what the legislature did not say (i.e., no exception provided for tort creditors) in its
spendthrift trust legislation. The only exceptions in that legislation were for self-settled trusts and
trusts funded via fraudulent transfer. Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 412 (N.H. 2001).
144 This was in fact the outcome in Jackson v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (Va.
2005). That outcome was clearly a consequence of state legislation that provided a specific list of
exceptions.
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claims.145 Upon adopting that state's version of the UTC, however, the
Arkansas legislature chose to omit UTC section 503 and its list of
exception creditors. 46 The legislature similarly omitted the section
504(c) exception in the case of discretionary trust interests as vulnerable
to dependent spouses and children.' 47 While it might be said that the
legislature simply chose to defer to the common law treatment of such
claims, this is not the likely result. 148 As one author recently noted in
commenting on the Arkansas UTC's omission of spouses as an
exception creditor in the case of spendthrift trust protections:
The chair of the [Arkansas UTC] Study Committee has stated that it
is not the intent of the Committee to weaken [the common law of
Arkansas, which recognized a spousal exception], but if this section
[503] does not become law, how can the legislature's rejection of
this section not have that effect? A compelling argument can
certainly be made that if a legislature refuses to enact a provision, it
is because it does not wish the content of that provision to become
statutory law. 149
Looking beyond the borders of Arkansas, there is hardly a uniform
trend to support the critics' general claims that the UTC will abrogate
spendthrift trust protections. More specifically, only four of the fifteen
UTC adopting jurisdictions have chosen to include the section 503
spendthrift trust exceptions basically as written.5 0 Five jurisdictions,
by contrast, have expressly chosen to reject those exceptions by
altogether omitting UTC section 503 from their enacted legislation,
although one of those jurisdictions does recognize state claims as an
exception.'51 The remaining six jurisdictions include some but not all of
the proffered exceptions. 5 2 The most common middle ground includes
as exception creditors the beneficiary's dependent children, while
rejecting or severely curtailing the rights of (former) spouses to
145 Council v. Owens, 770 S.W.2d 193 (Ark. 1989), discussed in Lynn Foster, The Arkansas
Trust Code: Good Lawfor Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 191, 231 (2005).
146 See Foster, supra note 145, at 228-36 (discussing the new Arkansas UTC legislation).
147 Id.
148 As to the common law supplementing the UTC, see the text accompanying supra note 57-
60. For the idea that courts have latitude to create exceptions where a statutory scheme is silent
on the subject, see Emanuel, supra note 15, at 205. That view is likely inapposite in the case of
the UTC, because, as explained in the text supra, the legislature has the entire UTC (including the
list of exception creditors) before it when it decides which portions are in accord with the laws
and policies of that state. Where the legislature adopts those portions of Article 5 that deal with
creditors' rights while omitting the exception provisions, it is a difficult path to argue that the
legislature simply felt that matter was one better left to the courts.
149 Foster, supra note 145, at 231.
150 The states are New Hampshire, Missouri, New Mexico, and Nebraska. New Hampshire
limits the recovery rights of a spouse to satisfaction of only the most basic needs.
151 The states are Arkansas, Oregon, Maine, and Kansas, with Tennessee including an
exception only for government claimants.
152 The jurisdictions are North Carolina, Virginia, South Carolina, Utah, the District of
Columbia, and Wyoming.
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recover. 153 Although some might thus call the result in ten jurisdictions
"pro-creditor" because some creditors are granted special status, the
corresponding reality is that the new trust legislation effectively ends
any prospect of further judicially-derived, policy-based creditor
exceptions to spendthrift trust doctrine in all fifteen jurisdictions. 154
Some might consider this development a positive one-i.e., such
policy decisions are, in fact, better reserved for the legislature. 155 One
might even say that a recognition of the judicial trends in public policy
exceptions to spendthrift trust protections underlies the new legislation,
thus rendering it a synthesis of years of judicial deliberation. It could
also be argued that over those years, the courts have refined public
policy in relation to respecting the settlor's desired protections such that
further broadening of those exceptions is simply unnecessary, if not
unwarranted. On the other hand, legislatures are likely to be less
flexible and responsive than the courts when it comes to adapting prior
laws and rationales to unanticipated new facts and policy concerns-
and there will always be unanticipated new facts and policy concerns. 56
Still, and notwithstanding the swift action by the Mississippi legislature
to protect trust beneficiaries after Sligh, it is hard to imagine a state
legislature intervening to deny spendthrift trust protection in a given
case or as to some heretofore excluded class of creditors, regardless of
particularly compelling facts or policy concerns. 57 The UTC adoptions
to date bear this out.' 58 From this perspective, then, going forward the
UTC could be viewed as effectively setting a baseline for trust
protections, from which states will generally only move towards
153 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-503 (providing an exception for "a beneficiary's child
who has a judgment or court order against a beneficiary for support and maintenance," but no
exception for spouses).
154 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(c) (2000). For an explanation of the operation of this
provision, see Newman, supra note 12, at 798 n. 139.
155 See, e.g., Dobris, supra note 1, at 572 n. 139 ("In this era of timid judges it is not beyond
the realm of imagination to say that it is appropriate for bold legislatures ... to usurp equity's role
and expand the spendthrift trust as nineteenth century American courts were willing to do.");
Emanuel, supra note 15, at 203-09 (favoring statutory solution to spendthrift trust issues, and
proposing model statute); GRISWOLD, supra note 8, § 565 (also proposing model statute).
156 Consider in this regard the case ofScheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. 2001), where
the spendthrift trust beneficiary not only molested a child (here the creditor was seeking to
recover against the trust), but also videotaped the event and broadcast it over the Internet. The
spendthrift trust debate would query: Should deference to a deceased settlor's right to dispose of
her largess to the exclusion of creditors trump any avenue towards recovery for the child? In
New Hampshire at the time, and likely in a UTC jurisdiction, the question is practically moot
absent contrary legislation.
157 It could be argued in opposition that states have been responsive to trending trust and estate
issues. The (legislatively) swift response to Sligh, the recent trend favoring self-settled trust
statutes, and the current UTC movement all serve as examples. In each case, however, public
choice theory could be said to affect outcomes, with interest groups lobbying either to maintain
or enhance existing trust protections. The estate planning bar as well as commercial trustees are
notable in this regard. See in this regard infra Part V.
158 See supra Part III.B.7; see text accompanying supra notes 142-149.
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enhanced protections. Of course, one could argue for or against this
proposition and likely find some support for either view. While the
following Part does not intend to resolve those differences, the
happenings discussed in Part V do seem to support the baseline
assertion.
IV. THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION
Specifically, expansion of spendthrift trust vulnerabilities is
unlikely due to the lack of any identifiably cohesive interest group
stating the case for more or broader exceptions. 59 This is due in part to
the influence of those who often have a hand in advising state
legislatures with respect to the adoption of that state's trust and estate
legislation. Local professional advisors have an interest in maintaining
aspects of local trust law that serve their clients and, not without
coincidence, preserve or enhance the desirability of their services.
Local attorneys, for example, are likely to derive a much greater share
of their business from planning estates, relative to trying to "bust"
trusts. Planning estates necessarily implicates asset protection, and the
extent of the marketing of that service in recent years cannot be
denied. 160
As to the effect this might have on legislation, consider the
influence of the state Bar in the case of the Kansas legislature's
adoption of the UTC, as well as that adoption's effect on the future
course of Kansas common law. As the UTC Reporter explained:
The Kansas [UTC study committee] agreed with [the UTC section
503] list of exceptions, but following introduction of the UTC [in the
legislature], the Kansas Bar objected. The Kansas UTC as finally
enacted eliminates these exceptions. This likely represents a change
in Kansas law. While the Kansas courts have not ruled specifically
on whether exceptions to a spendthrift provision exist, such
159 One group of textbook authors have commented in this regard that "perhaps the exceptions
have saved the rule. By carving out an exception for spousal and child support, courts and
legislatures have removed a powerful and sympathetic interest group from the debate over
spendthrift trusts. Who is left now to agitate for change?" DUKEMIN1ER ET AL, TEACHER'S
MANUEL, supra note 98, at ch. 7.
160 A July 31, 2005 Google search of "attorney & 'asset protection' & service" resulted in
240,000 hits, the first few pages of which were dominated by the marketing of asset protection
planning services. See also, for example, the Utah Bankers Association website, which asks the
question "Why does Utah deserve your trust business?" The answer provided is that "It has trust
laws which allow for the trust provisions you-the creator of a trust-want." First on the
demonstrative list that follows is "Utah allows you to protect your assets against creditors." The
site then touts limited state income taxation of trusts, followed by the 1,000 year dynasty trust
potential. See Utah Banker's Association, http://www.uba.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=23 (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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exceptions are well-established in the Restatement [Second], on
which the Kansas courts have traditionally relied. 161
In addition to local professionals, the interest of a state's
commercial trustee community must be acknowledged. Indeed, both
groups have played a significant role in motivating several state
legislatures to adopt domestic asset protection trust statutes for the
express purpose of competing with similar vehicles offshore. 162 More
specifically, despite widespread adherence to the traditional rule barring
self-settled protective trusts, at least seven state legislatures have now
been persuaded to abandon that rule. 163 Those states now permit a
settlor to place assets in a spendthrift trust of which the settlor is a
beneficiary, without subjecting that trust to the settlor's creditors'
claims. In a clear demonstration of the local interests expecting to
benefit from such legislation, five of these states generally require that
some portion of the trust assets reside in the state and that some portion
of the trust administration occur in the state.164
The potential gains to these interest groups are substantial. A
recent empirical study considering states that have relaxed their Rule
Against Perpetuities to permit perpetual trusts, for example, shows that
when coupled with more lenient state tax laws, such changes account
for the movement of over $100 billion in trust funds to the trending
jurisdictions. 65 This, in turn, represents annual trustee fees of over $1
billion, not to mention the impact upon local attorneys called upon to
ensure that such trusts comply with local laws. 66 Although the study
authors' opinions were inconclusive as to the impact of the new
domestic asset protection trust legislation in this regard-perhaps
because the phenomenon is as yet too recent to gauge-it is reasonable
to expect that this research will only further inspire the noted interest
161 English, supra note 47, at 334.
162 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 417 (2005) ("The
story of jurisdictional competition in trust law is a story of successful lobbying by banks and trust
lawyers, the principal beneficiaries of attracting new trust business to the state."); Sterk, supra
note 1, at 1060 n. 126 ("Organized interest groups, including the bar and trust companies, seek
legislation that will enable them to generate more business."); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
17, at 558 (noting the underlying DAPT motivation to attract trust business, discussing interest
groups, and relating DAPT movement to movement to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities); John
K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact
Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 63 n.79 (2000)
(discussing the fact that the drafters of the Alaska DAPT legislation were shareholders in Alaska
Trust Company, an entity doing trust business in the state).
163 Those states are Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, Nevada, Utah, Missouri, and South
Dakota. See supra notes 36-39 and the accompanying text for a definition of a self-settled
protective trust, as well as for a discussion of the traditional prohibition.
164 Those states are Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, Nevada, and Utah.




groups to pursue all available competitive trust advantages in their
states' laws. 167 Even without conclusive empirical quantification, asset
protection is clearly perceived by the local interest groups as a desirable
and marketable competitive advantage. 68 This perception appears to be
justified. 169 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the noted interest
groups will continue their efforts to influence legislation in this area.
A. Revving Up the Race to the Bottom?
Perhaps because their motives are more pure, the UTC and
Restatement (Third) drafters reject the recent trend favoring self-settled,
domestic asset protection trusts (DAPTs). 170  The drafters instead
endorse the traditional rule that a settlor's creditors may reach any
portion of a self-settled trust that is available for the settlor's benefit. 171
In reaching this conclusion, the drafters expressly acknowledge the
recent trend to the contrary and explain their rejection in their respective
commentaries. 172  Despite this rejection, however, the study and
adoption of the UTC could provide a prime opportunity for those who
favor DAPTs to bring their case to the attention of a given legislature.173
How states respond may ultimately shed light upon trust law's new
"race to the bottom."
More specifically, Professor Sterk has argued that the adoption of
self-settled domestic asset protection legislation by several domestic
jurisdictions could prompt other states to adopt similar legislation,
leading to more widespread abandonment of the traditional prohibition
167 Id. at 415 ("Unfortunately, our data do not yet allow us to confirm or deny the existence of
a significant domestic APT business ..... "); Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws Lure
$100 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at D1 (discussing Sitkoff and Schanzenbach research
and noting that "[t]he authors found 'tentative evidence' that permitting asset protection trusts
might increase a state's trust business, but caution that the data set was limited"); DUKEMINIER ET
AL., TEACHER'S MANUEL, supra note 98, at ch. 7 ("[T]heir findings on APTs were indeterminate,
perhaps because the phenomenon was too new to be reflected in the data.").
168 See supra note 162.
169 See, e.g., Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 162, at 378-39 ("[S]tatutory validation of
self-settled asset protection trusts, and ... state fiduciary income taxes ... are the principal
additional margins, beyond perpetuities law, on which the states compete for trust funds.")
(footnote omitted).
170 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b
(2001).
171 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2).
172 UNIT. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b.
173 This fact is acknowledged by the UTC drafters. See Legislative Update 2004, UTC NOTES
(Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws), Summer 2004, at 3 ("It is likely that some states
will follow Utah and choose to enact asset protection statutes and much of the rest of the UTC.").
The drafters, however, recommend against this approach. English, supra note 58, at pt. V1.H.4
("Although not encouraged, it is possible for states to combine the UTC with a provision
insulating self-settled in spendthrift trusts from creditor claims, as has been done in Utah.").
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against self-settled creditor-protected trusts. 174  Professor Sterk's
analysis includes consideration of the interest groups at work in getting
such legislation passed. 175 As noted, one reason that states adopt such
legislation is a desire to attract trust business, which undoubtedly favors
the local estate planning bar and commercial trustee community. 176
Another possible reason to abandon this prohibition is that the
potentially negative consequences of allowing such liability immunity
will be visited largely upon other states. 177 More specifically, the states
thus far leading the DAPT movement tend to be less-populated states
that do not garner recognition as major financial centers. 178 A key
objective for these states, therefore, is to attract trust business from
persons not resident in the DAPT state. 179 Given the mobility of trust
capital, if enough of these smaller states join the DAPT movement,
logic dictates that more significant financial players will have an
incentive to adopt similar legislation in order to retain their trust
business-thus, trust law's race to the bottom. 180
So far, only two of the fourteen UTC adopting states have
incorporated DAPT-enabling legislation into their UTC enactment.' 81
In both cases, the extent to which the self-settled trust protections were
affected by the state's consideration of the UTC or were wholly
independent of that process is not entirely clear. On the other hand, it
does not take a great leap of faith in either case to conclude that UTC
consideration has facilitated the move to greater self-settled trust
protections in those states.
B. The Missouri Example
Missouri is one of the states with legislation suggesting a link
between the UTC and enhanced protection for self-settled protective
trusts. By way of background, over a decade before the recent DAPT
trend began in Alaska, a Missouri statute authorized creditor protection
174 Sterk, supra note 1, at 1038-39.
175 Id. at 1057-61. For a more recent treatment of the effect of interest groups on significant
trust law trends, see Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 162, at 404, 411, 416-20.
176 Danforth, supra note 8, at 287; Sterk, supra note 1, at 1058-61 & n.126. See generally
DOBRIS, supra note 32, at 583-84.
177 See Danforth, supra note 8, at 364.
178 Sterk, supra note 1, at 1069.
179 This renders the "moral hazard" and other potentially negative consequences of DAPT
legislation an externality to the DAPT state, since DAPT settlors will generally not be acting in
the DAPT state and the thwarted creditors will also not generally be located in the DAPT state.
See Sterk, supra note 1, at 1066-74.
180 Id. at 1065-72; DOBRIS, supra note 32, at 583.
181 See infra text accompanying notes 182-195.
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for self-settled trusts. 182 Protection generally applied if a spendthrift
provision was present, the settlor was not the sole trust beneficiary, and
trust distributions were discretionary. 183  Federal courts applying
Missouri law, however, cast considerable doubt upon Missouri's place
as a self-settled asset protection state by denying protection in cases
involving self-settled trusts. 184  This led many asset protection
commentators to mention Missouri only in passing when discussing
favorable domestic asset protection jurisdictions. 85
In 2005, however, the Missouri legislature clarified the state's
position, in conjunction with the state's adoption of the UTC. This was
accomplished by specifically limiting the reach of UTC section
505(a)(2) as adopted in Missouri. 186 That provision as envisioned by
the UTC project drafters provides that creditors can reach the assets of a
self-settled trust. 87 The Missouri version of that section, on the other
hand, limits the reach of creditors to only self-settled trusts without a
spendthrift provision.188 The legislature has thus clearly embraced the
straightforward idea that a spendthrift provision is enforceable even
though the trust at issue is self-settled.
The newly enacted UTC legislation in Missouri represents a
reaffirmation, or perhaps a reemphasis, of the legislature's decision that
such trusts are not contrary to that state's public policy. Any future
contrary decision by courts applying Missouri law would now seem to
clearly contravene the legislature's intent. Despite this pronouncement,
however, Missouri has yet to truly join the DAPT trend via the adoption
of detailed legislation stating the requirements for self-settled trust
protections in the nature of the local, business-enhancing models seen in
Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, Nevada, and Utah. Whether Missouri
182 Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.080.3 (repealed 2004). See generally, James G. Blase, The
Missouri Asset Protection Trust, J. MIss. BAR, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 72 (discussing prior and UTC-
updated Missouri trust legislation); Scot Boulton, How Uniform Will the Uniform Trust Code Be:
Vagaries of Missouri Trust Law Versus Desires for Conformity, 67 MO. L. REV. 361, 377-79
(2002) (same).
183 See sources cited supra note 182. There were other conditions as well, such as the absence
of any fraudulent transfer in funding the trust and the settlor not possessing any right to amend or
revoke the trust.
184 See, e.g., Markmueller v. Case, 51 F.3d 775, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing statute yet
concluding that "[t]he public policy of Missouri is that one may not settle their own spendthrift
trust and avoid their creditors"); In re Enfield, 133 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991)
("Certainly, it is inequitable to allow an individual to put his assets beyond reach of creditors
through the simple expedient of creating a spendthrift trust.").
185 For a justifiably equivocal statement of Missouri's position in the asset protection
landscape, see Boxx, supra note 4, at 1203 n.30 ("Missouri may also recognize self-settled trusts
as enforceable to some degree.").
186 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.5.505(2)-(3) (2005).
187 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) (2000). The focus here, of course, is on irrevocable trusts.
For rules regarding creditor access to revocable trusts, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(1) and
(a)(3).
188 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.1.505(2)-(3).
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now proceeds to take this additional DAPT step after almost a decade of
more general self-settled trust legislation and conflicting judicial
decisions should prove informative in evaluating the impact of the UTC
movement upon the progression of trust law's noted race to the bottom.
C. The Utah Example
Utah is another state evidencing a link between the UTC and
enhanced protection for self-settled protective trusts. In the case of
Utah, the legislature has adopted detailed DAPT legislation similar to
the Alaska model. 8 9 The suggestion of a relationship between the
state's consideration of the UTC and adoption of DAPT legislation
proceeds from the implications of timing.
More specifically, Utah legislators first introduced UTC legislation
in December of 2001.190 In October of 2002, the Utah legislative
committee studying the UTC expressly posed the following question as
relevant to the state's UTC study:
[The] UTC provides that creditors of [a] settlor can reach ... assets
of an irrevocable trust where the settler [sic] retains beneficial rights.
This is consistent with current Utah law[,] but should Utah follow
Nevada, Alaska, Rhode Island, and Delaware and allow creditor
protection in self-settled irrevocable trusts? 191
The answer ultimately proved to be "yes." After the foregoing
question was posed and while the UTC was still under review in the
whole, Utah became a DAPT jurisdiction by enacting DAPT legislation
aimed specifically at enhancing local trust and professional service
business. 92  Specifically, Alaska-modeled DAPT legislation was
introduced in Utah on January 31, 2003 and became law on March 22,
2003.193 When the UTC was finally enacted a year later, the legislature
altered the Utah version of UTC section 505 to except from creditor
claims a self-settled irrevocable trust that complies with the
189 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (amended 2003 & 2004). The text of the current statute is
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-code/TITLE25/htm/25_02015.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2006).
190 UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-101 (2005); Utah SB 43 (proposed Dec. 19, 2001); Utah SB 47
(enacted Mar. 17, 2004).
191 INTERIM JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Status Report on Uniform Trust Code Review, October
23, 2002. A copy of this report can be found beginning at page 14 of a pdf file retrievable by
searching Utah State Legislature, http://www.image.le.state.ut.us/imaging/tHistory.asp (after
"subject" type "trust"; after "committee" type "judiciary"; after "date" type "23 oct 2002.") (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006).
192 See supra note 189.




requirements of Utah's DAPT statute.194 Thus, in the case of Utah, the
UTC was not directly used as a platform to promote and codify DAPT
legislation as part of the enactment of the broader UTC legislation. On
the other hand, the introduction and passage of DAPT legislation
following contemplation of the issue as expressly raised by the UTC
study committee seems significant. The Utah experience arguably
supports the idea that when state legislatures are called upon to consider
their common law of trusts in the UTC context, the door is opened to
consideration of where the state wants to align in the trending DAPT
environment. 95 Whether such logic is tortured or predictive should be
demonstrated over the next several years, and that in itself is reason to
take notice.
D. The Colorado Barometer
Given that only two states have adapted their versions of the UTC
to incorporate self-settled trust protections, it could be argued that the
UTC is having little effect on the potential race-to-the-bottom. Since
the UTC comments directly address and then reject the DAPT trend, the
lack of contrary action by most UTC adopting states might be viewed as
a solid endorsement of the traditional position. On the other hand, it
may be that acceptance of such a break with common law tradition is
simply too drastic a change to introduce in the context of a complex
statutory scheme that generally seeks to codify major portions of a
state's common law. If this is the case, it will be interesting to follow
whether the noted interest groups soon begin to push for a seemingly
straightforward amendment to the newly enacted statutory schemes,
while trust matters remain fresh on the legislature's mind. 196 In other
words, whereas Utah proceeded on simultaneous but separate UTC-
194 The DAPT legislation was adopted on March 22, 2003, while the state's UTC was being
studied. The UTC was subsequently approved by the Utah legislature on March 17, 2004, and is
set forth in the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Utah statutes, rather than as part of the UTC.
See supra notes 189-193.
195 Support for this idea can be found in the comments of the UTC drafters, as noted at supra
note 173.
196 The comments from the following New Hampshire law firm website demonstrate the
notion that after the UTC becomes law, asset protection "tweaking" can begin in earnest:
[F]or obvious public policy reasons, the Uniform Trust Code may have liberalized
access to spendthrift trusts and discretionary trusts, but only for the very limited
purposes and persons described above. Still, during the drafting of the Code and since
then, there has been much debate about these Code provisions. They certainly will be
the subject of further debate during the drafting of technical amendments to the
Uniform Trust Code and ultimately they may be amended by subsequent legislation, to
more fully restrict access to spendthrift trusts and discretionary trusts.
Michelle M. Arruda, New Hampshire Uniform Trust Code, http://www.cwbpa.com/UTC.htm
(last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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DAPT paths, states may proceed down the UTC path before separately
moving towards a pro-DAPT change to their common law.
Colorado may be an interesting case to follow in this regard.
DAPT proponents often reference Colorado as permitting self-settled
trust protections. This reference derives from a nineteenth century
statute that proponents construe as supporting self-settled trust
protections. 97 The Colorado UTC study committee, however, took a
different view of the import of that statute and proceeded to recommend
to the legislature that UTC section 505 be enacted as envisioned by the
UTC drafters-i.e., sans self-settled trust protections and consistent
with the study committee's view of existing Colorado law. 198 As to
where Colorado seems to be headed, however, consider the case noted
above involving the Kansas Bar's (successful) lobbying contrary to that
state's study committee's recommendation on the matter of exception
creditors. 99 Query whether interested groups will pursue an analogous
legislative outcome in Colorado, either during or reasonably subsequent
to legislative action on the UTC.
E. Tort Creditors Finally Find a Niche?
Straying a bit to contemplate DAPT legislation more generally, it
is interesting to note that of the five DAPT states, three permit tort
creditors to pierce the DAPT veil, with limitations. Utah favors tort
creditors where the settlor's conduct was intentional, criminal, or
fraudulent.200 Delaware and Rhode Island limit relief to claims arising
prior to the settlor's transfer to the DAPT.20' This undoubtedly reflects
197 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-111 (2005) ("All deeds of gift, all conveyances, and all
transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things in action, or real property,
made in trust for the use of the person making the same shall be void as against the creditors
existing of such person."). See Richard W. Nenno, Planning With Domestic Asset-Protection
Trusts, SK069 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 283, at pt. VIII.C (Apr., 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings cle/2005/spring/pt/AssetProctectionPlanning/NENNO-han
d.pdf, where in discussing Colorado's place as an asset protection jurisdiction the author notes:
Although the Tenth Circuit has held that the assets of an irrevocable self-settled
Colorado trust, the creation of which was not a fraudulent transfer and of which the
settlor was not the sole beneficiary, were immune from claims of future creditors,
Colorado attorneys and financial institutions have not promoted the technique and the
Colorado Supreme Court has questioned the statute's validity.
The referenced cases are Connolly v. Baum, 22 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Cohen, 8 P.3d
429, 432-34 (Colo. 1999).
198 See Colo. Bar Ass'n, Section 505, Creditor's Claim Against Settlor,
http://www.cobar.org/group/display.cfm?GenlD=2537 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) ("Apart from
'38-10-111, C.R.S. and cases arising under such section dealing with creditor claims during life
of the settlor there is no Colorado law on point.").
199 See supra text accompanying note 161.
200 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(c)(xi) (2005).
201 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3573(2) (2005); 1999 R.I. Pub. L. No. 402.
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a current manifestation of the traditional spendthrift trust debate. Self-
settled trusts have long been disfavored because deference to a settlor's
intent is not as strong a policy consideration where the settlor retains
some ties to the property. This is generally because the settlor's intent
in the case of a self-settled arrangement leans more towards immunizing
her property from her own creditors' claims, rather than exercising her
right to dispose of that property freely-as is the case when the settlor
makes a completed transfer to a trust that exclusively benefits third
parties other than the settlor.20 2 As noted in the discussion of Sligh
above, tort creditors have generally been disfavored as exception
creditors in the case of third-party created spendthrift trusts. 203 That
three of the five DAPT states would (i) disavow the traditional
prohibition against protections for self-settled trusts, while (ii) excepting
tort creditors from the protections afforded self-settled arrangements but
not third party arrangements, demonstrates the continuing flux in the
parameters of the spendthrift trust debate.
F. Digression with a Purpose
There is an ulterior motive underlying the seeming digression in
the foregoing Part IV.E. Specifically, that side note foreshadows a
more policy-based transition in the direction of this Article. The
discussion thus far has progressed from philosophies both academic and
practice-centered, to legislative formulation and underlying interest
group politics. The following Part V rounds out this progression by
relating federal policies and politics, as well as popular sentiments, to
the subject of trust asset protection. Exploring these influences
complements the foregoing consideration of law reform projects and
state legislative happenings. This is because ultimately, some synthesis
of all of these matters will drive the future course of trust asset
protection.
V. THE FEDERAL DIMENSION
In addition to the UTC and DAPT movements at the state level,
federal policies and politics should have a significant impact on trust
asset protection in the coming years. The most obvious of these is the
potential repeal of federal estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes.
There have also been stirrings in the bankruptcy field that could directly
202 Boxx, supra note 4, at 1252.
203 See supra Part III.
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affect the parameters of self-settled trust protections, to the particular
detriment of domestic jurisdictions relative to their offshore
counterparts. Finally, budget pressures at both the state and federal
level combine with ongoing public discussions over elder care (e.g.,
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid) to create an environment in which
the purposes and scope of protective trusts may gain increased attention,
and thus, increased scrutiny and possibly constraints.
A. Estate and GST Tax Repeal
The potential repeal of federal estate and generation-skipping a/k/a
"death taxes" raises many issues, three of which are particularly
relevant to the matter of trust asset protection. The first of these issues
is straightforward and relates to the wealth currently affected by the
noted transfer taxes. If these taxes are repealed or if the dollar level at
which the taxes apply is raised significantly, there will obviously be
more wealth available to pass to future generations. 04 In light of the
trend in many states to exempt trust interests from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, passing such wealth in trust becomes particularly
appealing. 20 5 Wealthy individuals contemplating their mortality will no
doubt appreciate the potential for enduring dead-hand control over their
wealth for what may perceivably be a thousand years or more. 206 Also
appealing will be the idea that if transfer tax repeal does occur but fails
to withstand the test of time, trusts created during the tax hiatus may
acquire the additional attribute of being "grandfathered" upon
reinstatement of the taxes, absent some retroactive application. Such
grandfathering has been seen in the past. In the case of the generation-
skipping transfer tax, for example, grandfathering resulted in exemption
from future application of the tax to trusts created prior to its 1986
effective date. 20 7
204 One recent compromise proposal would leave the estate tax in place, but raise the
exemption level to $10 million and lower the tax rate to 15%. Joseph J. Schatz, House Hits 4-0
on Estate Tax Repeal, 63 CONG. Q. 1013 (April 11-15, 2005). With regard to the potential repeal
estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes, see, for example, Dennis L. Belcher & Mary Louise
Fellows, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: Task Force on Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes, 58 TAX LAW. 93 (2004), and STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 106TH
CONG., JCX-14-01, DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (Comm. Print 2001).
205 With regard to the potential repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see Sitkoff &
Schanzenbach, supra note 162.
206 Utah, for example, has extended the Rule Against Perpetuities to a 1,000 year period for
interests in trusts. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1203 (2005).
207 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100 Stat. 2085, 2731. The actual
date for exemption was articulated by reference to trusts that were irrevocable as of September
25, 1985. Id. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 109TH CONG., JCS-2-05,
OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REDUCE TAX EXPENDITURES, 392-95 (Comm.
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The ramifications of transfer tax repeal or significant reduction
have deeper implications for the future of trust asset protection.
Although trusts often serve as mechanisms employed to reduce federal
transfer taxes over time, that objective is actually a corollary of the
larger estate planning objective of providing for the certain and orderly
transfer of property to the objects of the settlor's bounty. 20 8 Structuring
transfers to reduce the impact of such taxes simply takes into account
one important means by which the settlor's objectives might be
disrupted by forces external to the settlor's particular dispositive
plans-unless, of course, the settlor wishes to bestow her largess upon
the government. The government is, through its power to levy taxes,
merely one of the many creditors that might disrupt the settlor's plans
over time.
This raises a second point with respect to transfer taxes and trust
asset protection. Specifically, lessened concern over repealed or
reduced transfer taxes should heighten settlor awareness of other
creditors who retain the potential to disrupt the settlor's dispositive
plans. Indeed, typically conservative practitioners may find it
advantageous in the coming years to join the growing list of attorneys
marketing asset protection as either co-equal to or encompassing the
more specific and always appealing idea of tax planning. 20 9 As
observed in a recent National Law Journal article commenting on the
potential repeal of estate and GST taxes, "[w]hile it is true that a great
deal of the estate planner's practice is tax driven, a stronger emphasis on
wealth preservation for current and future generations will provide
plenty of work to keep estate planning attorneys off the unemployment
lines." 210 The prospect of a perpetual trust, coupled with the general
fear of runaway liability in a litigious society (which fear is often cited
as a key motivation behind the DAPT trend), could elevate more
Print 2005) (discussing history and present operation of the GST tax, and reform proposals
relating the GST tax to the movement by states to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities); Mitchell
M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 732-47 (2002)
(discussing history and operation of the GST tax).
208 See, e.g., Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Zaluda, Current Trends in Asset Protection,
19 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 307, 307 (2002) ("Preserving wealth from generation to generation is
a primary estate planning objective."); Alan S. Gassman, Common Mistakes Estate Planners
Make Regarding Asset Protection, 29 EST. PLAN. 518, 518 (2002) ("Asset protection is obviously
a big part of estate planning."); Rosen & Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. VI.A (discussing tax
planning and asset protection as goals of trust planning).
209 With regard to the marketing of asset protection, see supra note 160 and the accompanying
text.
210 Herbert Bockstein & Barbara L. MacGrady, T&E Planning Does Not End with Repeal,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14, 2005, at 13 (the article goes on to consider various non-tax incentives for
estate planning, with a particular emphasis on asset protection and dynasty trusts); see also
Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws Lure $100 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at
DI (noting continued viability of asset protection planning even if federal wealth transfer taxes
are repealed).
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general asset protection concerns to a place that is second only to
questions of who gets what, when.211 This could cut in two directions,
or as so often occurs with the American public today, in both directions
without consistent resolution.
More specifically, with an increasing emphasis on and concern for
asset protection planning comes: (i) an increased awareness of available
asset protection mechanisms, including trust options; (ii) an increased
understanding of to whose needs such devices are best suited; and (iii) a
potentially greater demand for locally available trust asset protection
alternatives, along with increased utilization of such devices where
warranted. This raises a third issue in relation to the potential for
transfer tax repeal. That issue pertains to public policy, how it is
shaped, and federal outcomes fostered by interest groups and ideology.
Specifically, the recent push to repeal federal estate and GST taxes
succeeded because of a savvy appeal to the "morality" of taxing death.
Apart from the genius of the "death taxes" moniker itself, commentators
recognize repeal proponents for their adept manipulation of the public
debate to focus on such evils (whether real or imagined) as death taxes
causing the destruction of family businesses and farms, causing the
same income to be taxed twice, and generally punishing the successful
realization of the American dream of upward mobility and prosperity. 212
As two commentators recently put it: "[t]hey presented repeal as a
seductively simple, unambiguous moral imperative that appeared to
promote both virtue and justice. ' 213 Popular anti-death tax sentiment
was also fostered by the unrealistic optimism of most Americans, with
40% believing that they will soon be among the richest 1% in our
211 See, e.g., Bockstein & MacGrady, supra note 210, at 13 ("As American society grows
more and more litigious, however, a number of states are changing their public policy to some
degree in order to permit the creation of what is commonly known as an asset protection trust (or
self-settled spendthrift trust)."); Rosen & Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. I.B (noting litigious
society and "ever expanding theories of liability" as motivating desire for asset protection);
Pamela K. Bergman, Family Law Update 2005 § 4.01 (2005), modified version available at
http://www.nicholslaw.com/CM/Articles/doc2.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) ("Professionals,
concerned with insulating their businesses and hard-earned money from staggering malpractice
money judgments, tort liability, and volatility of the business climate, legitimately employ
techniques to effectuate protection of their assets.").
212 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT
OVER TAxING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). A review of the book by Karen C. Burke and
Grayson M.P. McCouch can be found at TaxProf Blog. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P.
McCouch, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth, (June 1, 2005),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/files/burkemccouch.pdf (book review). An interview
with Mr. Graetz highlighting some of the book's conclusions can be found at Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., Interview with Professor Michael J. Graetz, NEWS Q. (A.B.A. Sec. Tax'n),
Spring 2005, at 16, 16-19. As to the validity of some of the repeal proponents claims, see, for
example, Richard Schmalbeck, Does the Death Tax Deserve the Death Penalty? An Overview of
the Major Arguments for Repeal of Federal Wealth-Transfer Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 749
(2000).
213 Burke & McCouch, supra note 212.
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economic social order.214 This no doubt partially explains why appeals
to "tax cuts for the wealthy" failed to carry the day.
Query whether the arguments levied and opinions shaped by the
death tax debate might have some impact on the future of trust asset
protection, particularly the self-settled variety. As discussed below,
objections to such protections have, in fact, recently been voiced in both
the popular media and Congress over the perceived advantages that self-
settled trusts provide to the wealthy. 215 If objections do persist, will
public indifference once again be grounded in an optimistic assumption
by most Americans that they are soon to need this protection to shield
their own certain future wealth? Another dynamic to consider is the
influential baby-boomer demographic. 216  Specifically, the baby-
boomers' desire to preserve their own inheritances-both to be received
and to be passed on-could affect the tenor of any meaningfully popular
sentiment towards asset protection trust devices. 217
On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that the
tepid public resistance to the repeal of a tax paid only by the richest
Americans will not carry over into any potential debate over trust asset
protection, which also tends to favor the wealthy.218 Regardless of
whether one views tax repeal opponents as one in the same with those
likely to decry asset protection trusts, it is likely that any resistance to
the trust asset protection movement will articulate a better case than did
transfer tax repeal opponents. Given that transfer tax repeal and asset
protection both involve advantages for those with wealth to plan for, the
general failures (thus far, anyway) of those arguing against tax repeal
should provide an education relevant to those arguing for more limited
parameters for trust asset protection. The tax repeal opponents are often
faulted for responding to the anti-tax moral case with bare technical
arguments supporting the imposition of the tax.219  Commentators
suggest that those opponents would have been much better served by
pursuing a moral stance that presented the issue as one of "opportunity
and democratic values ... embellished ... with compelling stories of
214 Id.
215 See infra notes 244-254.
216 The baby-boom generation currently numbers about 78 million, with approximately 4
million per year reaching the age of 60 beginning in January, 2006. Hillary Chura, More
American Retirees Seek Havens Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at C5. See generally A.
KIMBERLY DAYTON, THOMAS P. GALLANIS & MOLLY M. WOOD, ELDER LAW, CASES,
MATERIALS, 1-14 (2d ed. 2003) (providing a good overview of the demographics of the aging
American population).
217 Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations,
Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 7 (1989).
218 As will be discussed in more detail below, such a debate is, in fact, brewing.
219 Burke & McCouch, supra note 212.
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prodigal heirs.., born on third base yet behav[ing] as though they have
hit triples." 220
Those arguments may resonate when it comes to inherited wealth
passed on in trust for children and other descendants. Indeed, those
arguments basically echo the attack on spendthrift trusts posited by John
Chipman Gray in his well-known 1890s treatise. 221 Self-settled asset
protection trusts, however, present a different situation than does
inherited wealth-perhaps one more in line with American capitalistic
ideals. In this regard, an argument often presented in defense of self-
settled trust protections is "[w]hy should a person be allowed to live
debt free on the bounty of others [i.e., inherited wealth] while property
which he has accumulated by his own effort [i.e., self-settled wealth] is
denied the same immunity?" 222 Those hoping to curtail the protections
attributable to the DAPT movement will therefore need additional,
timely arguments if they hope to avoid the fate of transfer tax repeal
opponents.
B. The Bankruptcy Debate
It appears that DAPT opponents at the federal level are stating a
plausible moral case that is not so complex as to be missed by those
members of the public who participate in our political processes. As to
the politicians themselves, some might question the likelihood that any
meaningful resistance to the DAPT movement will arise. Those
doubters would be remiss, however, to discount the significant role that
another aspect of federal legislation-and the politics that accompany
such legislation-might play in this regard. Specifically, the recently
passed Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (the "Act") sparked coherent (though unvictorious) opposition to
self-settled asset protection trusts.223  The "opposition" here
encompasses both those opposing the Act's passage and those decrying
self-settled asset protection trusts, the two groups generally being the
same.
That opposition grounded its arguments in part on the disparate
advantages afforded the wealthy under federal bankruptcy laws.224 But
their arguments went further. The opposition also proceeded from the
simple moral premise upon which the Act was defended by its
220 Id.
221 Regarding Gray's arguments, see the text accompanying supra notes 40-46.
222 GRISWOLD, supra note 8, § 557.
223 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23.
224 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1980-81 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statements of Sens. Schumer
& Kennedy).
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supporters; namely, that one ought to pay one's debts. 225  More
specifically, the Act was touted by its supporters as cracking down on
credit card scofflaws who fail to pay their consumer credit debts by
seeking shelter under the Bankruptcy Code.226 That concept is in itself
relevant to the perception and acceptability of asset protection trusts,
echoing as it does Gray's spendthrift trust rant against a paternalistic
state and the obligation to pay one's debts.227
In the present setting, the argument finally met with some limited
success. In particular, similar arguments motivated changes to the
homestead exemption allowed under federal bankruptcy laws.
Homestead exemptions basically allow debtors to protect their homes
from utilization in payment of creditors in bankruptcy.228  The
exemption has been attacked both because it varies so drastically in
amount across states, and because it permits the wealthy to shield
millions from creditors by purchasing expensive (and bankruptcy-
protected) homes in states like Florida or Texas.229
The opposition to the unrestrained homestead exemption met with
only partial success.230 In lieu of imposing an absolute cap on the
protections afforded across state lines via the homestead exemption, the
opposition's victory was confined to limiting a debtors' ability to
manipulate the homestead exemption by moving to a homestead-
generous state in anticipation of filing bankruptcy. Specifically, the
recently enacted legislation caps the homestead exemption at $125,000
unless the debtor resided for more than three and one-half years in a
state permitting a higher exemption amount.23'
225 See, e.g., Michael R. Crittenden, Bankruptcy Bill has Parties Dug In, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY.
572 (March 7, 2005) (noting that the purpose of the Act was to "make it more difficult for
personal bankruptcy filers to escape debts they could repay," and further noting that "supporters
say it would prevent the abuse of the bankruptcy code by those able to repay their debts").
226 See, e.g., id.
227 GRAY, supra note 4, at ix, x.
228 For an explanation of the homestead exemption, see Eason, supra note 129, at 65-66. With
regard to the politics of bankruptcy legislation, public choice theory, and exemption policy in
particular, see Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.
L. & ECON. 19 (2004); Posner, supra note 123, at 106-08.
229 In those states, there is no dollar limit on the amount that can be shielded from creditors via
the homestead exemption. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, In Florida, No Wolves at the Door, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 3, at 6. For a treatment of the homestead exemption as it exists in the
fifty states, see ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES, supra note 7, at 175-92; NAT'L BANKR. REV.
COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 299-301 (1997) (setting
forth state-by-state designation of homestead exemption in table form).
230 Again, the "opposition" on the issue of limiting the homestead exemption can loosely be
associated with the "opposition" as identified in the text, supra.
231 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (West, Westlaw through 2005). Even this victory may prove to be
illusory, however, as one of the first rulings to apply the new provision held that the homestead
cap only applied in states that had not "opted-out" of the federal exemption scheme. In re
McNabb, 326 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005). Approximately 35 states had opted-out, thus
greatly reducing the reach of the recently imposed $125,000 cap. For a list of the "opt-out"
states, see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somner eds., 2005).
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Legislative proposals seeking to curb the self-settled asset
protection trust phenomenon proceeded from some of the objections
raised in the homestead exemption debate. Specifically, APT opponents
proposed amending the Bankruptcy Code to limit the amount of assets
that a settlor could shield in a self-settled trust.232 The mechanism for
this limitation involved the application of Bankruptcy Code § 541 (c)(2)
and the same $125,000 limit approved in the case of homestead
exemption manipulation. 233
Section 541(c)(2) allows courts to respect an anti-alienation
provision-thus precluding application of the affected property to
satisfaction of creditor claims in bankruptcy-to the extent the
provision is enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 234 A
spendthrift provision is generally regarded as constituting such a
restriction, the question usually being whether or not the provision is
enforceable under nonbankruptcy law in a given situation. Thus, if a
bankrupt debtor is the beneficiary of a trust that includes a spendthrift
provision, and if that spendthrift provision is enforceable under
applicable state law, then the debtor's beneficial trust interest and the
underlying trust property supporting that interest remain beyond the
reach of creditors, regardless of value. 23 5
Section 541(c)(2) has proven to be very important in the case of
third-party spendthrift trusts. 236 The provision also plays an important
role in shielding retirement plan assets from the claims of creditors,
even though many such plans could be regarded as in the nature of a
self-settled arrangement. 237 In the latter case of retirement plan assets,
232 151 CONG. REC. S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005).
233 Id. See the text accompanying supra notes 228-231 regarding the homestead exemption
cap.
234 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006). The Bankruptcy Code mandates that
anti-alienation provisions be ignored and requires the court to bring the affected interest into the
bankruptcy estate for application in satisfaction of creditor claims. Id. § 541(a)(1). However,
Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) provides a single statutory exclusion for such interests. Section
541 (c)(2) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under [the
1978 Code]." Therefore, if a bankrupt debtor is the beneficiary of a trust that includes an
enforceable spendthrift provision, the debtor's beneficial interest and the underlying property
supporting that interest remain beyond the reach of creditors. For a detailed explanation of the
exclusion under section 541(c)(2) as contrasted with the homestead exemption, see Eason, supra
note 129, at 52-71.
235 See, e.g., In re Wilcox, 233 F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 2000) ("An inquiry under § 541(c)(2)
normally has three parts: First, does the debtor have a beneficial interest in a trust? Second, is
there a restriction on the transfer of that interest? Third, is the restriction enforceable under non-
bankruptcy law?"). Similar reasoning has been applied with respect to discretionary trust
interests. See, e.g., In re Blackwell, 142 B.R. 301, 303 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) ("Thus, until that
[discretionary distribution] decision is made, the pension trust is tantamount to a spendthrift trust
such that the property would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.").
236 For a detailed description of the operation and importance of the section 541(c)(2)
exclusion, along with select legislative history, see Eason, supra note 129, at 53-62.
237 For a detailed treatment of this issue, see John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through
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ERISA specifically imposes an enforceable spendthrift restraint on such
plan interests. 238 Beyond that, however, non-retirement plan self-settled
arrangements have (until recently) never found significant shelter under
section 541(c)(2). The basic reason is that self-settled spendthrift
provisions typically have not been enforceable under state law by virtue
of the widely-followed traditional rule to that effect.239 Such trusts
therefore failed the basic requirement for protection under section
541(c)(2). When DAPT legislation first appeared on the scene, some
questioned whether section 541(c)(2) would apply to a suddenly
enforceable self-settled arrangement. 240 The concern was that, because
of the widespread unenforceability of such arrangements when section
541(c)(2) and its predecessor provisions were enacted, self-settled
arrangements were simply beyond the scope of legislative
contemplation, and therefore beyond the scope of protection under
section 541(c)(2). 241 Despite such concerns, the bare language of the
statute suggests that APT settlors have a significant avenue for
sheltering assets in bankruptcy by virtue of the new state DAPT
legislation and its interaction with federal bankruptcy law.242 Past
judicial pronouncements in the context of section 541(c)(2)'s
application to self-settled retirement plan interests support this
conclusion. 243
As the culmination of an eight-year congressional battle left the
Bankruptcy Act heading for almost certain passage in early 2005, the
idea that section 541(c)(2) might shelter self-settled, non-retirement
Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159,
210-18 (2004).
238 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 206(d)(1), 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000)). The comparable tax provision is found in 26
U.S.C. § 401(a)(13). See also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 3, § 156.3, at 185 (noting that
pension trusts are arguably self-settled in that "the trust is created in consideration of services
rendered by the employees, and that the employees are therefore the settlors").
239 See, e.g., In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435, 1444 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Not all ... retirement
plans... are spendthrift trusts: those retirement plans which are self settled do not qualify. And,
in particular, if the beneficiaries of a plan enjoy access to and control over the funds in the plan,
then the plan is not a spendthrift trust."). See generally PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION
LEGAL PLANNING STRATEGIES § 10.04(2)(d) (2005) (discussing spendthrift protections and self-
settled trusts).
240 See, e.g., David G. Shaftel, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Key Issues and Answers, 30
ACTEC NOTES 10, 21-22 (2004) (noting this argument). This question was considered again in
the 2005 Senate debates over the Act. See infra text accompanying notes 263-265; see also 151
CONG. REC. S2138-39 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005) (statements of Sens. Sessions and Schumer).
241 Several of the state DAPT statutes make clear that the authorizing state law is intended to
fall within the ambit of Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2). See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-
14(l)(a) (2005) ("The [spendthrift] provision shall be considered to be a restriction on the transfer
of the settlor's beneficial interest in the trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law within the meaning of Section 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code .....
242 The language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) is set forth in supra note 234.
243 See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). See generally Eason, supra note 237,
at 218-31 (discussing Patterson v. Shumate and its legacy).
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plan asset protection trusts gained increasing attention and was dubbed
the "millionaires loophole" in the popular media. 244 These stories
fueled sharp criticism of the perceived loophole by members of
Congress.245 In particular, opponents of the Act sought to close this
loophole, criticizing Republican backers of the Act for what opponents
alleged was a simple case of favor-the-rich hypocrisy.246 Specifically,
and as noted, the Act was intended to make it more difficult for
consumers to escape payment of their debts. Many of the Act's
opponents alleged that the Act worked to the particular disadvantage of
the poor and middle class, and to the advantage of the consumer credit
card industry.247 Self-settled asset protection trusts, by contrast, were
not affected by the Act and were viewed as a debt-avoidance measure
available only to the wealthy.248 Some found this loophole even more
troubling than the unlimited amounts that could be sheltered through the
homestead exemption, since utilization of a DAPT did not even require
a move to the debtor-friendly state.2 49
Against this background, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY)
proposed an amendment to the Act that would, if passed, significantly
impact the utility of self-settled asset protection trusts.250 Specifically,
the Schumer amendment would apply to a debtor in bankruptcy who
possessed an interest in a self-settled trust entitled to exclusion from the
bankruptcy estate by operation of section 541(c)(2). In such case, any
transfer to the self-settled trust made within ten years of the bankruptcy
244 Paul Krugman, The Debt-Peonage Society, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A23. This
loophole also received popular attention through coverage in other media outlets. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Schalch, Loophole Spotted in Bankruptcy Bill (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr.
14, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4600728; Brian
Naylor, Congress Overhauls Bankruptcy Laws (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4600645; Albert B. Crenshaw,
Keeping Some Hiding Places, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at F 1.
245 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1991-94 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (Statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(entering entire text of Gretchen Morgenson, Proposed Law on Bankruptcy Has Loophole, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at Cl, in the record of the debates over the Schumer amendment, discussed
infra).
246 See, e.g., Id. (Statements of Sen. Feinstein and Sen. Clinton) ("What about the wealthy
deadbeats?"); Crenshaw, supra note 244 ("Critics of the bill argued that if Congress were going
to pass a law making bankruptcy less hospitable for poor and middle-income people, it ought to
do the same for the wealthy."); Bankrupt Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A30
(editorial desk) (noting similar disconnect). Regarding the political party dynamics of the
bankruptcy legislation, see Crittenden, supra note 225, at 572-73.
247 See supra notes 244-246.
248 See supra notes 244-246
249 The availability of the homestead exemption generally depends upon the laws of the state
in which the debtor resides at the time of filing bankruptcy, although under the new Act there is a
forty-month residency requirement that must now be met before advantage may be taken of the
limitations (or lack thereof) under a state's exemption laws. Regarding the homestead exemption,
see supra notes 228-231 and the accompanying text.
250 The proposed amendment is set forth in full at 151 CONG. REC. S 1980-81 (daily ed. Mar. 3,
2005).
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filing could be set aside, to the extent the aggregate amount of all such
transfers exceeded $125,000.251 In support of his amendment, Senator
Schumer explained:
Here is the problem. In five States. . . millionaires and even
billionaires can stash away their assets ... in a special kind of trust,
so that they can hold onto that windfall even after filing for
bankruptcy [because] ... creditors would not be able to reach
anything in those trusts .... With this loophole, the wealthy won't
need to buy houses in Florida or Texas to keep their millions.... It
is a basic way for wealthy people to not pay their debts. 252
Characterizing the issue as one of fairness in the treatment of
wealthy versus other debtors in bankruptcy, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-
MA) similarly argued that "average families... cannot take advantage
of this loophole ... [but] that's all right because the asset protection
trust scam was . . . designed to protect millionaire deadbeats. '253
Despite these appeals, however, the Schumer amendment was defeated
in the Senate 56 to 39, with Republicans generally united in
opposition.254
The Senate did, however, pass another amendment affecting
DAPTs. That amendment was sponsored by Senator Jim Talent (R-
MO). The amendment relates to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(A),
which provides for a one year limitations period during which the
bankruptcy trustee can set aside any transfer deemed to have been
fraudulent. 255 The Talent amendment extended that one year limitations
period to ten years, but only in the case of a transfer to "a self-settled
trust or similar device" made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors. '256
Clearly, then, self-settled asset protection trusts have appeared
plainly on the congressional radar screen. Beyond this simple fact,
there are two possible ways to view rejection of the Schumer
Amendment and passage of the Talent Amendment. Each view
suggests a markedly different future for the viability of these self-settled
protective trusts.
As to the Talent amendment, DAPT proponents view its passage as
troubling, but more so because of its sloppy language (e.g., "trust or
similar device") than a feeling that Congress was truly after DAPTs
251 Id
252 151 CONG. REC. S1992 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
253 Id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
254 Id.
255 Id. (statement of Sen. Talent).
256 The amendment is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the
provision and its history, see Gideon Rothschild, Did Bankruptcy Reform Act Close 'Loophole'
for the Wealthy?, 107 TAX NOTES 492 (2005). For a discussion of the importance of limiting the
time period during which a settlor's APT remains vulnerable to a fraudulent transfer claim, see
Shaftel, supra note 240, at 17-18.
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generally or determined to meaningfully impede their effectiveness. 257
The amendment's "actual intent" requirement, and the fact that most
DAPT states already provide that a fraudulent transfer to a DAPT can
be avoided in any event, serve as the basis for this confidence. 258
Further still, the amendment would have virtually no real effect on those
using DAPTs for the purposes and in the manner many practitioners
advocate. Specifically, many asset protection planners assert that an
APT should only be used to shelter a "nest-egg," and that settlors should
retain sufficient funds to discharge any anticipated debts when the trust
is funded.259 Some even suggest that an APT should include a provision
directing the trustee to satisfy any claim based upon a debt that was
incurred prior to establishment of the trust.260 To these practitioners, the
Talent amendment may have little effect beyond the unsatisfying feeling
that a settlor might have to litigate a matter as to which she ultimately
feels confident of victory. 26' For all practical purposes, then, the Talent
amendment was perhaps a simple face-saving gesture passed with an
eye towards hindering malfeasant corporate directors, and not a frontal
assault on DAPTs. 262
Continuing with this viewpoint, DAPT proponents hailed the
defeat of the Schumer amendment as having quite favorable
implications for the burgeoning DAPT market. Proponents claim that
the congressional discussions of the amendment confirm that DAPTs
257 David G. Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Impact of New Bankruptcy Provisions on Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts, 32 EST. PLAN. 28, 30 (2005), available at
http://shaftellaw.com/docs/article 25_pt3.pdf ("If the new amendment is construed and applied
similarly to Bankruptcy Code section 548 and UFTA, then the enactment of this provision will
have added little to the law in this area.").
258 As to the difficulty proving actual intent to defraud in the case of a self-settled trust, see
151 CONG. REC. S2138 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005) (Statement of Sen. Schumer); see also Sterk,
supra note 1, at 1047 ("[P]roving actual intent is notoriously difficult."). Professor Sterk also
discusses the debtor-friendly provisions of Alaska's self-settled spendthrift trust statute, noting as
particularly creditor-unfriendly the statute's inclusion of an actual intent standard, without any
constructive fraud provision. Id. at 1053.
259 Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth M. Schuring, What ACTEC Fellows Should Know About
Asset Protection, 25 ACTEC NoTEs 367, 370-71 (2000) (explaining that asset protection
attorneys should conduct a "solvency analysis" of prospective APT clients and suggestion that
sheltering 30% of that portion of the client's wealth that accounts for the client solvency); Shaftel,
supra note 240, at 17 ("A 'rule of thumb' has developed concerning the portion of a client's
assets which should be transferred to a DAPT... no more than one-third."); see also Costigan,
Jr., supra note 3, at 491-92 (opining that self-settled trusts should be respected where the settlor
"keeps out of the trust assets sufficient to discharge his existing debts"); A. JAMES CASNER &
JEFFREY N. PENNELL, 1 ESTATE PLANNING § 4.1.4 (6th ed. Supp. 2002) (discussing protection of
a "nest-egg" portion ofa settlor's wealth).
260 See, e.g., Rosen & Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. I.D.4.b (suggesting this approach).
261 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 244 ("[A]nyone prescient enough to set up a trust and
move assets into it well before getting into trouble would likely be untouched by the new rule.").
262 The stated purpose of the Talent amendment was "[t]o deter corporate fraud and prevent
the abuse of State self-settled trust law." 151 CONG. REC. S2138 (statement of Sen. Talent).
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fall squarely within the section 541(c)(2) bankruptcy exclusion. 263
Those proponents take the matter a step further by arguing that
consideration of the two noted amendments-and in particular the
failure of the Schumer amendment-"placed squarely before Congress
the question of whether DAPTs, formed without fraudulent transfers,
should be allowed. Congress decided affirmatively, by a wide
margin. '264 In this view then, Congress has presumptively endorsed the
extensive asset protection afforded by DAPTs. Apart from the
fraudulent transfer inconvenience, under this view the prospects for
continued growth in the prevalence of such trusts look favorable, to say
the least.
While there is some merit to the foregoing reasoning, a ringing
congressional endorsement of DAPTs is hardly apparent. The idea that
section 541(c)(2) encompasses DAPTs, moreover, is not much of a
revelation in light of the "plain language" interpretation given that
provision by the Supreme Court in its 1992 Patterson v. Schumate
decision. 265 There are even a few negatives associated with the Talent
amendment that suggest it should not be so quickly dismissed. As
DAPT proponents themselves point out, for example, the Talent
amendment is hardly a model of drafting clarity. That amendment will
likely require technical corrections, and possibly judicial construction,
before its full import is settled.266 This presents further opportunity for
imposing more stringent limitations. Regardless of its actual effect,
moreover, the Talent amendment could deter more conservative settlors
from pursuing DAPTs. This is because regardless of the lack of any
associated fraud, some settlors may find a meaningful disincentive in
the fact that their trusts would remain subject to litigation for the
extended limitations period. 267
As to the import to be accorded the defeat of the Schumer
amendment, a keener understanding of Senate politics should leave
DAPT proponents troubled. Republican opposition to that amendment
likely had as much to do with a desire to get the Act through the Senate
without complicating amendments as it did with any particular
263 See Shaftel & Bundy, supra note 257, at 28.
264 Id. at 30.
265 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). The court in that decision expressly disavowed
any need to consult the legislative history because, according to the court, the plain language of
the statute was clear. See generally Eason, supra note 237, at 218-20. As to section 541(c)(2)
sheltering DAPTs, a similar question was raised on the Senate floor, to which Senator Schumer
responded that the exclusion in that case was "pretty clear-cut," as opined upon by congressional
staff attorneys. 151 CONG. REc. S2138-39 (Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
266 Shaftel & Bundy, supra note 257, at 30-31; Rothschild, supra note 256, at 493-94.
267 The perceived importance of this vulnerability is evident from one of the touted features of
both domestic and offshore APT legislation that is designed to lure trust business. That
advantageous feature is a shortened statute of limitations for bringing fraudulent transfer claims.
See Shaftel, supra note 240, at 17-18 (discussing this issue).
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endorsement of DAPTs. This is because the bankruptcy legislation was
a Republican favorite, twice vetoed by President Clinton.268  That
legislation had been languishing in the halls of Congress for over eight
years.269  Prior efforts to push the Act through the Republican-
controlled Congress, for example, were once thwarted by Democrats'
introduction of an amendment that would remove bankruptcy protection
for certain abortion protestors.270 The Republican Senators therefore
wanted to keep the legislation "clean" through the current battle, in
order to increase the likelihood and speed of enactment.
But if the Schumer amendment's defeat can be attributed more to
political maneuvering than to substance, how then does one explain
passage of the Talent amendment? A plausible explanation is that, in
contrast to the Schumer amendment, the Talent amendment was
acceptable because: (i) it was Republican-sponsored and therefore likely
to encounter little resistance in the Republican-dominated House; (ii) it
provided an opportunity for Republicans to "save face" by saying they
had addressed the recently publicized DAPT "millionaire's loophole";
and (iii) it simply modifies an existing Bankruptcy Code provision by
extending its limitations period, whereas the Schumer amendment
would effectively supplant federal deference to state law regarding the
efficacy of certain protective trusts-that deference representing a
federalism aspect of bankruptcy legislation for over 100 years.271
Given this explanation, the comments on the Senate floor of
Republican Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) are worthy of note.
Senator Grassley took a leading role in defeating the Schumer
amendment. Consistent with the above explanation of the amendment's
failure, Senator Grassley first cited the pursuit of an unencumbered
Senate bill as he appealed to a need for further study to avoid the
Schumer amendment's potential for "unintended consequences. 272
Most interestingly however, Senator Grassley then proceeded to clarify
his stance on the Schumer amendment when he said: "[b]e sure ... that
my opposition to this amendment doesn't mean that I will not ultimately
find that this issue needs to be addressed at some future date. 273
Apparently, other Republican senators felt likewise. More specifically,
Senator Schumer reported afterwards that he counted ten Republican
senators stating that they would have voted in favor of the amendment
were it not for the Senate leadership's strong push to reject all
268 For a detailed explanation of the history of this bankruptcy legislation, see Eason, supra
note 237, at 231-32 n.265.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 On the latter point, see 151 CONG. REC. 1994. (2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley); Posner,
supra note 123, at 106-08 (discussing federalism aspects of bankruptcy exemptions).
272 151 CONG. REC. 1994 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
273 Id.
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Democratic efforts to encumber the legislation with amendments,
without regard to how meritorious those amendments might seem.274
This outlook may prove prescient, because it may be difficult for
those recently favoring the Act to oppose a future version of the
Schumer amendment without seeming hypocritical, given the rhetoric
emanating from the Republican side of the isle about assuming personal
responsibility for one's debts. With the excuse/pressure to pass a clean
bill no longer present, a future introduction of this amendment might
very well find its way into the Bankruptcy Code. Given the strong
language employed by supporters of the Schumer amendment-
"outrageous 275 and "shocking loophole" 276 for example-it seems
reasonable to speculate that a similar amendment will in fact be
forthcoming. The most plausible arguments against passing such an
amendment in the future will likely be (i) an assertion that the Talent
amendment adequately addresses the problem, and (ii) concern that the
Schumer amendment raises federalism concerns by trumping state
decisions as to the validity of spendthrift trust protections. 277 Whether
these arguments succeed, fail, or result in strengthening of the Talent
amendment's limitations, it does bear the potential to meaningfully
affect the DAPT movement.278
The idea that an amendment similar to Schumer's could pass
Congress presents an interesting consequence. The Schumer
amendment would clearly weaken the potential protection afforded by a
DAPT. Such an amendment would, however, likely have little effect on
a properly structured offshore APT (OAPT). Although a bankruptcy
court has nationwide jurisdiction and can thus deal with any DAPT, that
court does not have international jurisdiction. 279 In part because of this,
and in part because of constitutional and other uniquely domestic
274 Stephen Labaton, Senate Rejects Efforts to Alter Bankruptcy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2005, at C4. The Senate, for example, rejected a Democratic amendment that would have
provided additional bankruptcy protections for families affected by military service in the Middle
East. Another amendment would have helped families facing bankruptcy due to enormous
uninsured medical bills.
275 151 CONG. REC. 1981 (2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
276 Id.
277 Regarding this federalism issue, see the text accompanying supra notes 123, 271.
278 Although self-settled trust are not banned under the Schumer amendment, they would face
significant new exposure to creditors' claims. Recall that unlike the Talent amendment, the
Schumer amendment does not require "actual intent" or other triggers apart from the $125,000
threshold and section 541(c)(2) exclusion. If nothing else, this may push all but the young-
wealthy to simply skip the DAPT trend and move directly to the more traditional and protection-
certain third party spendthrift trust. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 244, at FI (quoting Harvard
Professor Elizabeth Warren as stating, with regard to the possibility that the protections sought
through a self-settled trusts might be thwarted under the Bankruptcy Code: "Only a childless,
unmarried, orphaned hermit who could think of no one to make the ultimate beneficiary... of his
trust... has to worry").
279 11 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2000). For a detailed discussion of the limits of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction in the context of APTs, see Sterk, supra note 1, at 1089-100.
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concerns, a properly structured OAPT is likely to provide immunity
from domestic creditor claims more quickly and more certainly than
would a DAPT.280 The bankruptcy trustee, for example, would have
little practical ability to levy against offshore trust assets, regardless of
any ten year limitations period or the absence of an exclusion under
section 541(c)(2). 281 It would seem that the most a court could do
would be to deny the debtor-settlor a discharge from her debts in
bankruptcy. 282
If a settlor truly relinquishes control of an OAPT located in a
debtor-friendly offshore jurisdiction, moreover, a court would have little
basis for holding a debtor-settlor in contempt of court, as has been done
in a few cases where settlor control or blatant fraud were evident. 283
Thus, from a planning perspective at least, an enacted Schumer
amendment may simply undermine DAPTs, while luring more dollars
into offshore asset protection vehicles. 284 The Internal Revenue Service
would not be happy with this consequence. 285 Query also whether
interest groups benefiting from the annual $1 billion in trustee fees
flowing to trust-friendly (though not necessarily asset protection) states
might see this as a negative development and thus lobby their local
congressmen to oppose the legislation.286 To the extent that seems
plausible, one should not overlook the sway such groups have had at the
state level in getting DAPT and other trust-friendly laws passed.287 In
any event, the Schumer amendment prospect bears close watching for
those interested in charting the future course of the DAPT phenomenon.
280 For comparisons of the protection afforded DAPTs relative to that afforded by OAPT's,
and a rundown of particular advantages inherent in the OAPT model, see, for example, Rosen &
Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. VII.A.6; Nenno, supra note 197, at pt. XV.
281 See supra note 279.
282 With regard to alternative sanctions against a trust settlor where the trust assets remain
beyond the court's reach, see, for example, Lischer, supra note 13, at 576-96; Sterk, supra note 1,
at 1100-01; Bergman, supra note 211, at 19-21.
283 See Lischer, supra note 13, at 584-85 n.94 (discussing academic versus practitioner spin on
the import of these cases); Rosen & Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. VI.I. 1 ("Other cases with
similarly egregious fact patterns will likely gamer similar results.").
284 With regard to the potential flight of trust capital from the United States to offshore locales,
see Sterk, supra note 1, at 1106, 1114-15 ("The bigger problem is with offshore trusts ... [w]ith
respect [to which] American courts have fewer tools to enable creditors to reach trust assets. As a
result, offshore trusts remain attractive .... "); Rosen & Rothschild, supra note 2, at pt. XV
(comparing advantages offered by OAPTs relative to DAPTs, and vice-versa); Eason, supra note
162, at 101-04 (discussing drawbacks of limitations on APTs that would impact the domestic
variety more severely than the offshore variety, due to constitutional and other concerns unique to
the domestic trust).
285 For a discussion of the IRS concern that offshore trusts serve primarily as a vehicle for tax
evasion, see Eason, supra note 162, at 51-53, 101-04.
286 As reported by Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 162, at 411.




Another aspect of the potential federal influence on the future of
protective trusts relates to the Medicaid program. The Medicaid
program was established by Congress in 1965, is jointly funded by the
federal and state governments, and is administered by each state within
federal parameters. 288  The program exists to provide healthcare
coverage for those with low incomes and insignificant assets.289 In fact,
Medicaid "is the nation's largest public health insurance program and
pays for nearly half of all nursing home care in the country. '"290
Because the costs of long-term nursing home care can quickly
impoverish those who do not qualify for government-supported care,
"Medicaid planning" has become a popular legal strategy among those
who are "wealthy" by Medicaid standards. 291  The basic idea of
Medicaid planning is for an individual to impoverish herself for
Medicaid qualification purposes while simultaneously preserving her
assets for, among other things, surviving spouses and lineal
descendants. 292 As this technique spreads, the government finds itself
confronting the prospect of maintaining the Medicaid program in the
face of increasing healthcare costs and a rapidly aging American
populace.293  The competing objectives of individuals (seeking to
qualify) and the government (seeking to limit costs) have led to "look-
back" rules whereby an individual forfeits Medicaid eligibility for three
years or more following certain asset transfers, as well as federal
288 LAWRENCE A. FROLICK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THfE ELDERLY OR DISABLED
CLIENT § 14.01 (2d ed. Supp. 2005); Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid (last visited Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CMS Website].
Frolick and Brown describe the program as "a federal program operated at the state level."
FROLICK & BROWN, supra, § 14.01. For a recent treatment of the federal-state budgetary
interaction, see David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2611-15
(2005).
289 CMS Website, supra note 288.
290 Naomi Karp et al., Medicaid Estate Recovery: A 2004 Survey of State Programs and
Practices, at 8, available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ilU2005 06 recovery.pdf (last visited
Apr. 13, 2006).
291 See generally Jane Gross, In Effort to Pare Medicaid, Long-Term Care is Focus, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2005, at Al (discussing the Medicaid and long-term care financing situation, and
some of the strategies employed by individuals trying to maximize their options under the current
system).
292 There are, of course, certain protections built into the qualification guidelines to protect a
couple's income and assets for use by the non-institutionalized spouse. A detailed explanation of
Medicaid qualification criteria, state variations, and Medicaid planning strategies is beyond the
scope of this Article. For further details, see, for example, FROLICK & BROWN, supra note 288,
at ch. 14. For examples of Medicaid planning situations, see Thomas D. Begley, Jr. & Andrew
W. Hook, Legal Ethical Issues in Transferring Assets for Medicaid Planning: Case Studies and
Contrasts, 30 EST. PLAN. 522 (2003).
293 Medicaid Reform, A Preliminary Report from the National Governors Association, at 1,
available at http://www.nca.org/cda/files/0506medicaid.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Governor's Report].
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legislation mandating that states seek to recover costs from the estates
of former Medicaid recipients. 294
With this background in mind, there is much that can be said about
Medicaid in the context of trust asset protection. The government's role
as creditor and the effects of trust interests upon a trust beneficiary's
eligibility for Medicaid are important issues. Not surprisingly, much
has been said about the technical structuring of trusts to minimize
conflict with Medicaid-related objectives. 295 In light of the current
discussion of federal policies affecting the asset protection environment,
however, different concerns are addressed here. In this regard, it is
helpful to understand the current Medicaid program as representing a
conflict-or perhaps competition is the better word-among four policy
dynamics. Considered together, these dynamics may have important
implications as to how protective trusts are perceived and tolerated in
the coming years.296
First among the referenced dynamics is the reality of the current
government budget situation at both the state and federal level. 297
Couple that with the rising cost of healthcare and the imminent aging of
the baby-boom generation, and the prospects for maintaining even the
currently flawed system of financing long-term care seem bleak.298
This reality helps to explain the call in President Bush's latest budget
proposal for more stringent rules regarding the asset transfers that often
294 A Medicaid recipient's estate might have value notwithstanding the income and resource
eligibility criteria, because not all assets or sources of income count in this determination.
Homes, for example, are often excluded. See generally FROLICK & BROWN, supra note 288, at
ch. 14 (discussing qualification criteria, asset transfers, potential penalties, and Medicaid estate
recovery); Janel C. Frank, How Far is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid Estate Recovery, 79
N.D. L. REV. 111 (2003) (discussing Medicaid program and estate recovery process).
295 For recent treatments, see Jason A. Frank, Long-Term Care in the 21st Century, MD. B. J.,
July-Aug. 2005, at 18; Bernard A. Krooks, Elder Law Planning: Oil and Vinegar? What
Attorneys Need to Know About Special Needs Trusts, SK059 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 277 (Mar. 2005);
Andrew H. Hook, What the Trust and Estate Lawyer Needs to Know About d(4)(A) Special Needs
Trusts, 29 ACTEC J. 192 (2003); CLIFTON B. KRUSE, JR., THIRD-PARTY AND SELF-CREATED
TRUSTS (3d ed. 2002).
296 Although in the Medicaid context protections are typically afforded via discretionary trust
interests, little is lost by generalizing about spendthrift trust concerns, in this broader context of
variations on protected versus vulnerable trusts and trust interests.
297 See, e.g., Ed Gordon, Big Cuts for Medicaid in Bush's 2006 Budget (National Public Radio
broadcast Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story
/story.php?storyld=4522598; Sonji Jacobs, Overhaul of Medicaid: South Leads Charge to Create
New Models, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 31, 2005, at F7 (discussing efforts to reform Medicaid
program in the face of rising costs and limited budgets); John D. McKinnon, Budget Pressures
Test Republicans on Tax Increases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at A5 (discussing deficit and
budget pressures like the military action in Iraq, Medicare prescription drug benefits, and Social
Security reform).
298 See, e.g., Bernard A. Krooks, Eldercare, TR. & EST., Jan. 2003, at 47 ("Facing severe
budget shortfalls, of which long-term care is one, if not the single largest item, many states are
aggressively restricting access to Medicaid. And courts are backing them.").
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accompany a "Medicaid planning" strategy of self-impoverishment. 299
States are similarly acting to restrict access to Medicaid-funded long-
term care for those perceived to have the means to provide more for
themselves. 300
This implicates a second policy dynamic that is as much a
circumstance of the current political environment as it is of the
burgeoning federal budget deficit (if the two are in fact distinct).
Specifically, there is an increasing push for what has been called an
"ownership society," a corollary of which is the increasing call for
"personal responsibility. ' 30 1 Such calls were part of the debate over the
Bankruptcy Act noted above and have also gained attention in the
context of reforming Social Security.302 In the Medicaid context, these
concepts translate into the idea that individuals should bear more
responsibility for the financing of their own long-term care.303 A report
recently released by the National Governors' Association, for example,
identifies as its first theme reform proposals that include "a number of
incentives and penalties for individuals to take more responsibility for
their health care. '304
The call for more personal responsibility in financing long-term
care (the second noted dynamic), coupled with increasing limitations on
asset transfers and other strategies designed around the Medicaid
program (the first noted dynamic), together implicate a third policy
dynamic. Simply stated, the combined effect of implementing the
referenced policies can only serve to expose and likely deplete the
assets of current and future seniors. Affected seniors might otherwise
have transferred such assets to subsequent generations. Preserving
assets for both the senior's supplemental care and transfer to subsequent
generations are, in fact, the primary goals of the genre of legal practice
that has come to be known as Medicaid planning. 305 In this regard, one
commentator has observed that "children ... want 'their
299 An overview of and links to the President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposal can be found
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/2006 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006); see also Gordon,
supra note 297.
300 States Scramble to Solve High Medicaid Costs (National Public Radio broadcast Mar. 14,
2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4534118.
301 In the Social Security context, for example, the "ownership society" mantra played a
prominent role in the spinning of President Bush's private account proposal.
302 With regard to the bankruptcy debate, see supra Part VI.B. With regard to Social Security
reform, see Bus. WK., May 16, 2005, at 24; Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk without Privatizing
the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 243 (2004).
303 Bernard A. Krooks, Taking Stock, TR. & EST., Jan. 2004, at 46 (including by-line "Every
man for himself: governments are trying to shift health care costs back to individuals; while the
feds are leading people into the commercial market, states are offering no alternatives-they just
want to cut benefits.").
304 Governor's Report, supra note 293; see also Gross, supra note 291.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 291-294 regarding Medicaid planning.
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inheritances....' Simply put, the engine that drives the divestment of
assets to qualify for Medicaid is the children. They feel entitled to an
inheritance . "...-306
The relevance of this to trust asset protection arises through
interaction with a fourth policy dynamic. Specifically, the depletion of
assets either to pay for long-term care directly or to become eligible for
Medicaid-paid care is a distinctly middle-class phenomenon. Simply
stated, the poor by definition don't have much anyway and are therefore
generally eligible for Medicaid.307 The rich don't need (or necessarily
want) Medicaid-paid care because they can make other, likely better,
arrangements. 30 8 A middle class senior, by contrast, is not eligible for
Medicaid prior to self-impoverishment, which is likely in the case of
age-related infirmity given that most middle class seniors generally
cannot afford to sustain payment for long-term care.309 As one Elder
Law attorney recently testified before Congress, these seniors face a
"lose-lose" situation-lose their health and face a staggering cost of
care, or impoverish themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid
benefits. 310 It is this situation that has led some to view the Medicaid
outcome as "the estate tax on the disabled," or perhaps more accurately,
the estate tax on the middle class age-infirmed. 31'
An article recently appearing in the popular press touched upon all
four of the policy dynamics noted here. In discussing the current U.S.
long-term care situation and the efforts to reform Medicaid, that
article's author explained:
The idea is to restrain the explosive growth in the taxpayer
contribution to the cost of long-term care for middle class Americans
in frail old-age by making it harder to qualify for government
benefits and shifting costs to individuals .... Lawmakers are
rushing... proposals to remove from the Medicaid rolls people who
are not poor by standard definitions.... [This issue of] long-term
care.., holds a disproportionate place on the national agenda
because of the baby boom generation, 78 million strong. Many of
the boomers are managing their parents' care, snarled in Medicaid's
306 Dobris, supra note 217, at 7-8.
307 Long-Term Care and Medicaid: Spiraling Costs and the Need for Reform, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005)
(Statement of Bernard A. Krooks) [hereinafter Krooks Statement].
308 Id. Those arrangements might include the purchase of long-term care insurance, or
perhaps simply using some portion of their assets to pay for long-term care directly. See Krooks,
supra note 298, at 47.
309 The cost of a nursing home for elders can be as high as $100,000 per year, and so for a few
years' stay this represents a total estate depletion that is much less significant to those standing in
line to inherit millions, than to someone standing in line to inherit (absent such costs) say,
$500,000. See Gross, supra note 291.
310 See Krooks Statement, supra note 307.
311 Id.
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regulations and hoping to preserve an inheritance to pay for their
own old age.312
As the foregoing attests, the policy dynamics considered here are
not simply ideas buried in the halls of academia or under the green
visors of government actuaries and accountants. This is mainstream,
every day stuff.
D. Are We There (Where?) Yet?
So, consider where this leaves us. We have the baby boom
generation, many of whose members are both becoming seniors
themselves and facing the prospect of overseeing care (and assets) for
their own elderly parents. The situation is common and personally felt.
At the same time, we have an environment where "gaming the system"
through asset divestment or other means of preserving wealth are the
object of growing government attention and limitation. Such strategies
are under attack by those who would impose more "personal
responsibility" for the generally unavoidable costs of declining health in
old age.31 3 The consequences, in turn, are visited primarily upon the
middle class, to the detriment of middle class inheritances. Yet, at the
same time, we see a federal debtor-creditor framework that facilitates
the preservation of unlimited wealth through self-settled and other
protective trusts, which, depending upon the chosen state law, may
obviate the need to pay any creditors at all. Looking deeper, we also
find a tax system on the verge of permitting unlimited (or greatly
increased, from a middle class perspective) sums of wealth to pass from
generation to generation. Couple all of this with the growing movement
to embrace perpetual trusts at the state level, and Gray's feared land
where "men not paying their debts should be kept in luxury on inherited
[or now, even self-made protected] wealth" 314 has perhaps never been
closer to realization.
But whether the policy dynamics underlying these movements will
find purchase outside the realm of stereotypically described liberal
academics, northeastern congressmen, and likewise geographically-
challenged editorialist has yet to be seen. Beyond the halls of Congress
and state capitols, it is unclear what will move the broader public, if
anything. Will they be moved by their optimism for their own prospects
312 Gross, supra note 291.
313 Of course, death prior to the onset of physical or mental deterioration that requires skilled
nursing care is an alternative, as is the prospect of having a family that can and will care for the
senior outside of the nursing home environment. The alternatives, however, are not necessarily
available or acceptable to many seniors.
314 GRAY, supra note 4, at 246.
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of becoming wealthy, or their own middle class reality of dwindling
inheritances in light of greater restrictions (increased asset transfer
penalties) and vulnerabilities (estate recovery) and private costs in the
Medicaid context. One could further wonder which might prevail: the
general American aversion to aristocratic privilege, or the equity of
allowing the self-made man to do for himself what the wealthy have
long been able to do for their heirs?31 5 Whether the currently powerful
conservative movement can maintain its mantra of personal
responsibility while resisting changes to the current asset protection
landscape-particularly the self-settled variety-is another question that
will bear upon trust asset protections in the coming years. Should
protection for the self-made fall, moreover, one would have to ponder
whether similar protections for unlimited amounts of inherited wealth
would thus be rendered vulnerable too.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to set forth above several ideas for consideration
in evaluating the likely future course of trust asset protection. I am sure
there are many more questions, as well as ideas and arguments when it
comes to answering those questions. As to predictions about where all
of this will lead, however, I defer once again and finally to the words of
John Chipman Gray: "I am no prophet, and certainly do not mean to
deny that [these protective trusts] may be in entire harmony with the
Social Code of the [new] century. ' 316
315 On the latter point, see GRISWOLD, supra note 8, § 557.
316 GRAY, supra note 4, at x.
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